

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 16 October, 1943 — File No. 11
[10/2]

(8)

Wag
TES

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4 3 8 0Q
RECD: 16 OCT, 5:25PM

0 (161651Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8100
BT
S E C R E T BONN 15007

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, GW, EG, IS, XF
SUBJECT: US DECISION RESUPPLY ISRAEL

The School's reaction
to US monopoly

REF: (A) STATE 204575 (B) STATE 203685

SUMMARY: I TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL OCTOBER 16 IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REFTEL (A). SCHEEL'S RESPONSE WAS VERY SYMPATHETIC AND POSITIVE. HE AGREES THAT IN FACE OF MASSIVE SOVIET WEAPONS DELIVER-IES US HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RESUPPLY ISRAEL. HE APPEARED NOT TO BE SURPRISED BY NEWS THAT WE ARE DRAWING SOME MATERIAL FROM STOCKS IN FRG. HE NOTED THAT THERE ARE OCCASIONAL EMERGENCIES THAT MAKE IT NECESSARY TO ACT IMMEDIATELY IN SITUATION THAT WOULD NORMALLY CALL FOR PRIOR CONSULTATION. HE ASKED ON URGENT BASIS FOR DETAILS OF WHAT WE ARE DELIVERING FROM FRG. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING THIS INFORMATION SOONEST. END SUMMARY

1. DRAWING ON BOTH REFEELS, I TOLD SCHEEL THAT OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE FROM THE BEGINNING WAS TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE FIGHTING UNDER CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO A LASTING PEACE. TO THIS END WE HAD BEEN IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS AND WITH THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT. I TOLD HIM THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS MAKING AN UNREMITTING PERSONAL EFFORT TO GET THE SOVIETS TO COOPERATE BUT THAT ALL EFFORTS HAD SO FAR BEEN WITHOUT SUCCESS. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SOVIETS HAD AT A VERY EARLY STAGE BEGUN A MASSIVE AIRLIFT TO RESUPPLY THE ARAB FORCES. SOVIET REFUSAL TO HEED OUR REPEATED REQUESTS TO STOP MADE A US DECISION TO RESUPPLY ISRAEL INEVITABLE. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF THE US AND THE EUROPEANS THAT PEACE BE RESTORED IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT THE SOVIETS NOT BE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

- 2 - BONN 15007, 16 OCT '73

PERMITTED TO OBTAIN ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGES OR TO UPSET THE BALANCE OF POWER THERE. I SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO RECEIVING FULL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FROM ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN THIS MATTER, AND THAT THEIR ATTITUDE WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON OUR FUTURE RELATIONS.

2. I THEN TOLD SCHEEL THAT THE US RESUPPLY EFFORT REQUIRED THE MOVEMENT TO ISRAEL OF SOME ITEMS FROM US STOCKS IN THE FRG AND THAT PREPARATIONS FOR THESE SHIPMENTS HAD ALREADY BEGUN. THE SITUATION WAS MOVING SO RAPIDLY THAT THIS HAD HAD TO BE DONE BEFORE WE WERE ABLE TO INFORM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. I CONFIRMED TO SCHEEL THAT NO US MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IN THESE MOVEMENTS OR IN THE MID-EAST CONFLICT AND THAT THE RUMORS ABOUT ALERT MEASURES IN THE HEIDELBERG AND DARMSTADT AREAS WERE WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

3. SCHEEL SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD HOPED THAT THE CONFLICT COULD BE STOPPED AT THE VERY BEGINNING. REGRETTABLY, THIS HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE AND HE NOW SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE COURSE SECRETARY KISSINGER IS TAKING. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGREED THAT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENTLY EXISTING SITUATION PROVIDED THE BEST CHANCE FOR A SOLUTION. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY US RESTRAINT AS REGARDS RESUPPLY, HOPING THAT THIS RESTRAINT WOULD BE HONORED AND RECIPROCATED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. SOVIET FAILURE TO RECIPROCATE OBVIOUSLY LEFT THE US NO CHOICE BUT TO MOUNT ITS OWN RESUPPLY EFFORT.

4. THUS, SCHEEL SAID, THE US COULD COUNT ON THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE FRG AS IN THE PAST. HE WAS CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT NEITHER THE FRG ALONE NOR THE EC COUNTRIES TOGETHER COULD TAKE A DIRECT AND ACTIVE ROLE IN SEEKING A SOLUTION IN THE MID EAST UNTIL THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD MANAGED TO AGREE. WITHOUT US-SOVIET COOPERATION, THERE COULD BE NO END-TO THE DISPUTE.

5. SCHEEL DID NOT SEEM SURPRISED BY THE NEWS THAT SOME OF THE MATERIEL FOR RESUPPLYING ISRAEL WOULD BE DRAWN FROM US STOCKS IN THE FRG. HE SAID THE FRG WAS FULLY AWARE THAT THERE WERE OCCASIONAL EMERGENCIES THAT REQUIRED IMMEDIATE ACTION, EVEN WHEN, IN A FORMAL LEGAL

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

- 3 - BONN 15007, 16 OCT '73

SENSE, THIS MEANT FAILURE .TO ADHERE TO AN AGREEMENT FOR PRIOR CONSULTATION. IN THE CASE OF NATO, THERE WERE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE THAT ACTIONS WERE NOT TAKEN WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY DETRACT FROM THE ALLIANCE'S STRENGTH. IN DUE COURSE, WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER FILLING WHATEVER GAPS AROSE, SO AS TO AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION THAT EUROPEAN DEFENSES WERE BEING WEAKENED AS A RESULT OF THE MID-EAST WAR.

6. SCHEEL SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF THE DETAILS OF US SHIPMENTS OF MATERIEL OUT OF THE FRG, BOTH AS TO TYPES OF EQUIPMENT AND QUANTITIES. THE FRG NEEDED THIS INFORMATION ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, NOT TO MAKE PUBLIC BKT SO THAT IT WOULD ITSELF BE INFORMED ABOUT WHAT WAS TAKING PLACE ON ITS TERRITORY. I UNDERTOOK TO GET THIS INFORMATION FOR HIM URGENTLY AND WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THIS COULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY ATTENTION.

7. SCHEEL PROPOSED TO ANSWER FUTURE ARAB QUERIES (THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR WAS MEETING WITH FONOFF POLITICAL DIRECTOR LAHN AT THE SAME TIME I WAS TALKING WITH SCHEEL BUT HE WOULD NOT RECEIVE A DIRECT REPLY J THIS TIME) BY STATING THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SHIPMENTS OF US MATERIEL FROM THE FRG TO THE MIDDLE EAST, THAT THESE SHIPMENTS WERE BEING MADE ON THE BASIS OF A CONCRETE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE US AND THE FRG, AND THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE SUCH EMERGENCY MEASURES IN ORDER TO BALANCE THE SOVIET RESUPPLY ACTION.

8. IN CONCLUSION, SCHEEL PRESENTED SOME OF HIS OWN VIEWS ON THE ISRAELI-ARAB DISPUTE. HE FELT THAT THE RELATIVELY QUIET CONDITIONS THAT HAD PREVAILED SINCE 1967 WERE IN FACT DUE TO AN UNBALANCED SITUATION, I.E. TO ISRAELI SUPERIORITY AND TO THE POWERFUL EFFECT THAT THE 1967 DISASTER HAD HAD ON THE MINDS OF THE ARABS. IF WAR HAD ERUPTED AGAIN, IT WAS PERHAPS BECAUSE SOME KIND OF BALANCE HAD BEEN RESTORED. HE ARABS HAD ACQUIRED NEW WEAPONS AND, MORE IMPORTANT, AN ABILITY TO USE THOSE WEAPONS THAT HAD BEEN LACKING IN 1967. THIS BEING THE CASE, THERE WAS A SENSE IN WHICH ONE WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT MAINTAINING A BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST MEANT MAINTAINING WAR. SCHEEL FELT THAT BOTH SIDES TO THE

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TELEGRAM

4 - BONN 15007, 16 OCT '73

DISPUTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRESSED MUCH HARDER IN THE
LAST SIX YEARS TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION. NO ONE
COULD PERSUADE HIM, HE SAID, THAT THE ARABS HAD NOT
AT ONE TIME BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN INTERNATIONAL
GUARANTEE OF ISRAEL'S BORDERS. THIS LED BACK TO THE
POINT HE HAD MADE BEFORE--AND WHICH HAS BEEN A LEITMOTIV
IN ALL OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION
WITH THE GERMANS--THAT ONLY A COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY THE
US AND THE SOVIET UNION CAN BRING ABOUT A POLITICAL
SOLUTION.
HILLENBRAND

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

Z 161640Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6829
RUEHCR/COMUSFORAZ FLASH
BT
SECRET LISBON 3820

CONTROL: 4 3 3 7 Q
RECD: 16 OCT 73Z 17 04

NODIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR
SUBJ: USE OF SANTA MARIA AIRPORT

FOR SECSTATE:

1. HAVE JUST RECEIVED FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM COMUSFORAZ:
QTE 1. NO LATER THAN 24 HOURS PLAN TO USE SANTA MARIA AIRPORT
AZORES AS A RECOVERY FIELD FOR MAC AIRCRAFT RETURNING FROM ISRAEL.
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT USING SANTA MARIA WILL BE DETERMINED BY
REFUELING CAPABILITIES AT THAT STATION. IT IS ANTICIPATED
THAT APPROXIMATELY EIGHT EMPTY REPEAT EMPTY AIRCRAFT WILL
UTILIZE AIRFIELD PER DAY FOR REFUELING ONLY PRIOR TO RETURNING
TO CONUS.
2. DUE TO FACT THAT SANTA MARIA FALLS UNDER ANOTHER CIVIL
GOVERNOR'S DISTRICT PLUS PENDING LAJES FIELD NEGOTIATIONS AND
DISCUSSIONS REQUEST YOUR IMMEDIATE COMMENTS AND CONCURRENCE.
3. THIS IS AN OPERATIONAL NECESSITY. WAITING FOR YOUR
SOONEST ANSWER. COMSTOCK SENDS. UNQTE.

2. SANTA MARIA IS PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AIRPORT IN
AZORES. USE OF SANTA MARIA BY MAC AIRCRAFT RETURNING FRO ISRAEL
LIKELY TO BE LOOKED UPON BY GOP AS ESCALATION OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT
IN ISRAEL RESUPPLY OPERATION. TO APPROACH GOP FOR CONCURRENCE
IN USE SANTA MARIA WOULD BE TO RISK DELAY AND/OR NEGATIVE RESPONSE.
ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PERMISSION, JUSTIFYING
USE AFTER THE FACT BY REFERENCE TO FOREIGN CLEARANCE GUIDE
WHERE SANTA MARIA SPECIFIED AS ALTERNATE TO LAJES "WHEN
UNUSUAL SITUATIONS OR WEATHER MAKES USE OF LAJES IMPOSSIBLE."
GOP WILL OF COURSE LEARN OF OUR USE OF SANTA MARIA VERY QUICKLY.
THEY MIGHT SAY NOTHING BUT IT MORE LIKELY THEY (PARTICULARLY
FONMIN PATRICIO) WILL REACT STRONGLY TO WHAT THEY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2-LISBON 3820, OCT 16

WILL LOOK UPON AS INSTANCE OF US TAKING GOP FOR GRANTED AND
UNILATERALLY INCREASING RISKS TO PORTUGAL OF ARAB RETALIATION.
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

FOR COMUSFORAZ:

PLEASE CABLE IMMEDIATELY TO SECSTATE INFO LISBON FULLEST
POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR OPERATIONAL NECESSITY USE SANTA MARIA.
POST
BT
#3820

SECRET



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COPY 29 OF 15 COPIES. *Wav*
10/16

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4 3 7 8Q

RECD: 16 OCT, 3:42PM

0 161737Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8094
BT
SECRET BONN 14999

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: GW, MILI, IS
SUBJECT: USCINCEUR REQUEST FOR FACILITATING US WEAPONS
SHIPMENT TO ISRAEL

REF: USCINCEUR MSG DTS L6L44LZ OCT 73 (ECJ4/BS-L7225)

1. WE RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM USCINCEUR UNDER REFERENCE
ABOVE REQUESTING US TO ADVISE THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN
BONN TO ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION FOR A SHIPMENT OF TANKS,
HOWITZERS AND AMMO VIA ISRAELI VESSEL FROM BREMERHAVEN.
FULL TEXT OF MESSAGE FOLLOWS.

2. QUOTE.

SUBJ: PROJECT 9DD SHIPMENTS (U)

A. JCS L5L052Z OCT 73 (NOTAL) (S)

1. (S) REF A DIRECTS THAT SURFACE SHIPMENTS FROM
GERMANY WILL BE SHIPPED THROUGH PORT OF BREMERHAVEN ON
ISRAELI OWNED OR CHARTERED SHIPS.

2. (S) REQUEST ISRAELI EMBASSY BE ADVISED THAT SHIP-
MENT DESCRIBED IN PARA 4 BELOW WILL BE READY FOR LOADING
AT BREMERHAVEN WHEN ISRAELI FLAG OR ISRAELI CHARTERED
SHIP IS ON BERTH. THE ISRAELI EMBASSY SHOULD BE RE-
QUESTED TO ARRANGE FOR THE APPROPRIATE OCEAN LIFT AND
ASCERTAIN A-L SPACE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR LOADING.

3. (S) ALL SHIPPING ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY ISRAELI
EMBASSY MUST BE CLEARED BY THEM WITH GOVERNMENT OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

4. (S) SHIPMENT TO BE AVAILABLE FOR LOADING CONSISTS
OF:

A. 65 TANKS, M60 WEIGHT EACH 93,000 LBS; CUBE EACH
3368.0 CU FT.

B. 23 HOWITZER'S, ML09 WEIGHT EACH 44,437 LBS; CUBE
EACH 2208.2 CU FT.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

- 2 - BONN 14999, 16 OCT '73

C. 75,000 ROUNDS, M105MM AMMUNITION: TOTAL WEIGHT 2,700 TONS; TOTAL CUBE 146,000 CU FT. NOTE: WEIGHT AND CUBE ARE ESTIMATED.

5. (S) IN ORDER TO COORDINATE MOVEMENT OF MATERIAL TO THE PORT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT LOADING, WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED OF ARRANGEMENTS TAKEN BY ISRAELI EMBASSY TO INCLUDE EXPECTED TIME OF ARRIVAL OF SHIP AT BREMERHAVEN.
UNQUOTE.

3. WE WOULD APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS ASAP WHETHER WE SHOULD PROCEED TO MAKE THE SHIPPING ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HERE OR WHETHER STATE OR DEFENSE IS MAKING THEM WITH THE ISRAELIS IN WASHINGTON OR ELSEWHERE.
HILLENBRAND

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Department of State

WH 7 ^{War}
TELEGRAM

SECRET

0161600Z OCT 73
FM EMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5211
BT
SECRET JIDDA 4549

4 3 1 7 Q
16 OCT 73 Z16 29

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PSOR, SA, XF
SUBJ: US ARMS TO ISRAEL: SAUDIS SORROWFUL; KING MAY SEND
ANOTHER MESSAGE

REF: JIDDA 4543

1. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH EMBOFF OCT 16, DEP CHIEF OF ROYAL
DIWAN MANSOUR KHURAJI INDICATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE
FURTHER COMMUNICATION FOR USG FROM SAG THOUGH NO INDICATION
OF WHAT OR WHEN.

2. EMBOFF REPORTS ALSO, THAT ON BASIS DISCUSSIONS WITH
KHURAJI AND OTHER SAG OFFICIALS, SAUDS EMPHASIS NOT SO
MUCH THAT US AT FAULT BUT MERELY THAT DIRECTION THINGS NOW
HEADING PROMISE LITTLE BENEFIT EITHER FOR US, OR FOR ANY-
ONE ELSE IN ME. HE TOLD BY GOOD SOURCE THAT AT RAMADAN
PARTY NIGHT OF OCT 15 (WHICH INCLUDED VARIOUS PRINCES AND
DIWAN FIGURES), THERE WAS NO VISIBLE ANGER AT US ANNOUNCE-
MENTS, BUT RATHER GENUINE EXPRESSION OF SORROW THAT USG
MOVE HAD SET COURSE FOR INEVITABLE DIVERGENCE OF INTERESTS
OF US AND SAG.

3. "MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER" ATTITUDE EVIDENT ALSO
IN MANNER OF PRINCE NAWWAF AND ROYAL COUNSELOR PHARAON
WHEN KING'S LETTER (REFTL) PRESENTED. DURING READING OF
LETTER, PHARAON REMOVED HIS GLASSES AND COVERED HIS FACE
WITH HANDS IN GESTURE OF ANGUISH. WOULD GUESS FROM ABOVE
THIS REPRESENTS OFFICIAL ATTITUDE: DIE HAS BEEN CAST;
IT OBVIOUS SAG DOES NOT EXPECT POSITIVE REPLY TO FAISAL'S
LETTER, WHICH WOULD BE ONLY WAY, FROM SAG POINT OF VIEW,
FOR US/SAG TO GET BACK ON SAME TRACK. AKINS

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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war
10/16

ARAB AND ISRAELI PUBLIC REACTION
(USIA Summary)

Tuesday, Oct. 16

Algiers 2032
LOU

Algeria

- Algiers Radio gave top billing to a report of the despatch of additional marines to the Mideast, linking it to President Nixon's remarks which "gave reason to believe in the possibility of US intervention". The station then reported McCloskey's resupply announcement . . .
- el Moudjahid (regime-supported daily): p.1 headline "Official: Washington rearms Israel"; separate headline reported Boumedien's trip to Moscow with a subhead: "From NATO bases, gigantic US aerial bridge to reinforce Zionist material and manpower strength." The article quotes McCloskey, but then adds the "gratuitous accusation against the USSR since no proof has been provided of Soviet shipments along normal air corridors." In a separate article reporting President Nixon's remarks, the paper concludes "direct intervention by U.S. forces cannot be discounted". The paper also printed an AFP story that 300 U.S. aircraft transited the Azores in the past 2½ hours.

Khartoum 2296
Secret

Sudan: Press and radio gave banner treatment to arms resupply announcement, describing it as "US intervention". Media featured alleged DOD confirmation of airlift (not seen at Embassy). Radio and editorial comment identifies US as main enemy supporting Israel, charges US intervention always favors Israel rather than Arab states. And calls for "direct action" through oil and finance. Beneath anti-imperialist verbiage, commentators note but discount Soviet arms supply and US rationale on maintenance and security all Middle East nations.

FBIS 77
10/16 11472

Iraq: The official Iraqi News Agency in Arabic at 0835 GMT: Beirut -- The U.S. Embassies in a number of Arab capitals have asked the American nationals to leave the Arab countries following President Nixon's announcement on U.S. intervention on the side of Israel in the current war in the area area. The newspaper al-Ahrar, organ of the socialist Arab Ba'th party, today reports that the American Embassies have been asked to help in the Evacuation of their nationals and to secure special means to return them to the United States.

ARAB AND ISRAELI PUBLIC REACTION
(USIA Summary)

Tuesday, October 16

Rabat 4684
LOU

Morocco: media reaction to the announcement the U.S. is resupplying Israel was restrained, giving the news factually but the media interpreted the President's remarks as an intervention threat no commenting were published.
- al Alam (Opposition Istiqlal Party daily) headline: "Nixon warns of U.S. military intervention to protect Israel"
- l' Opinion (also Istiqlal) headline: "U.S. A. ready to intervene military in the Middle East"
- le Matin (pro-government daily) "Nixon reaffirms total support for Israel" but does not give the details of his remarks
- Maghreb Informations (trade union paper) headline: "American imperialism ready to intervene militarily"

Amman 5533
Conf.

Jordan: The government has ordered its officially-controlled radio station to limit commentary and avoid polemics in discussing the U.S.
- Radio Amman in Arabic at 7:00 a.m. Amman time carried McCloskey's Monday statement together with a report of Boumedien's trip to Moscow seeking arms and a long report of Sen. Fulbright's call for cease-fire and Israeli withdrawal. The 8 and 9 a.m. news did not mention the item. The English service at 7 a.m. carried McCloskey's explanation that the resupply was in reaction to the Soviet airlift.

Tel Aviv 8197
Conf.

Israel: The press gives prominent coverage to the US efforts to resupply Israel, based exclusively on reports from Washington newspapers and wire service stories out of Lisbon. The public is focusing on this news as much as on the war news today.

ARAB AND ISRAELI PUBLIC ACTION
(USIA summary)

Tuesday October 16

(Cairo 3124
conf.)

Egypt: all Cairo papers carry p.1 articles quoting Pres. Nixon that US policy today is as it was toward Lebanon in 1958 and Jordan in 1970, and infer US military intervention. Press also contains McClosky resupply announcement. Neither story is more prominent than war news or news of Sadat's speech today: coverage of US news remains moderate.

(Amman 5532
conf)

Jordan:

-daily al Dustur: banner headline "Will US enter militarily to protect Israel?" subheads: "Nixon says America sees its role as being peacemaker; State Department announces officially start of provision of military equipment to Israel". The story says this is in response to the Soviet airlift to Syria and Egypt.

-al Ra'y (daily, close to government): headline "Airbridge between Washington and Tel Aviv", subheads: "Washington officials: we will use force to ensure the security of Israel". The story is sourced to Reuters and does not mention the Soviet airlift.

-al Sabah (independent daily) headline: "Washington issued two important announcements; arrival of arms in Israel."

-Jordan Radio: Arabic and English newscasts carry US resupply story and emphasize US is responding to Soviet moves; story is not the lead item. (Jordan Radio is government controlled)

(FBIS 57
10/16
1002Z)

Egypt: Voice of the Arabs in Arabic to the Arab World, 0525GMT: Under the headline "America's weapons will not frighten us", today's al Akhbar says: The US made an official announcement yesterday to the effect that it had actually started to provide Israel with weapons and equipment. The US State Department justified the step, which implies extreme hostility to the Arabs, by saying that it is designed to prevent Soviet arms supplies to the Arab world from disturbing the balance of power.... The U.S. very clearly wants Israel to perpetuate its occupation of Arab territories and wants to provide Israel with the means of carrying out its criminal and brutal raids on civilian targets in Egypt and Syria. The US does not want peace to be established in the Middle East....The US will realize that it has lost when the Arab people decide to strike at its interests in this region.

(FBIS 18
10/16
0232Z)

Egypt: government-operated Middle East News Agency on Arabic 0012GMT: Commenting on US President Nixon's statement threatening direct military intervention in the Middle East, al Ahram says...the primary indication in this threat is that of the Israeli position....The aim behind this threat is to boost Israeli morale and to bow to the Zionist pressure on Nixon in the US. But the US would not put its forces on a combat line with Israel on Arab lands...the US would not interfere militarily unless to protect Israel's official borders which the US recognizes.

ARAB AND ISRAELI PUBLIC REACTION
(USIA summary)

Tuesday October 16

(FBIS 71
10/16
1122Z)

Algeria: Algiers Radio in French, 0730 GMT:

The spokesman for the US Defense Department said this morning that the US was today sending about 2,000 marines to strengthen the personnel of the 6th fleet which is cruising the Mediterranean because of the war in the Mideast. This decision comes a few hours after President Nixon's statement in which he clearly let it be understood that the US could intervene directly in the conflict on the side of Israel.

(FBIS 34
OUO
M160307)

Egypt: the government-operated Middle East News Agency is carrying the substance of the daily press, 0057GMT:

-al Aghram commentary: The Arab states should deal their blows to the positions which hurt the enemy, including the US defiance of the whole Arab nation by its official declaration of intervention by supplying Israel with arms..

-al Akhbar headline "US weapons will not frighten us"

-al Jumhuriya: Israel and the US are currently leading a campaign calling for a cease-fire on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts....Such a request reflects, more than anything else, the reality of the extremely critical condition Israel is facing in the Sinai and the Golan and the enormity of the losses Israel has suffered....Any attempt by Israel and the US to stop the fighting is an attempt which violates the UN resolutions and international will.

(Kuwait 3770)
uncl.

Kuwait: both the McClosky resupply announcement and President Nixon's remarks about Lebanon and Jordan made frontpages:

-al Siyaasa (independent daily): headline: "Nixon opens up possibility of sending American troops to Mideast."

-al Ra'y al Aam (independent, conservative daily) headline: "U.S. threatens direct military intervention"; editorial: "There is always the possibility that the White House, stirred by American Jews and their lobbyists, may foolishly involve itself in another war after the fiasco in Vietnam and Korea. Nixon's threat is probably aimed at cutting the ground from under the Arab oil-producing countries which will be meeting here tomorrow to discuss possible steps in connection with the cut in the flow of oil."

-Kuwait Times: headline "The great American betrayal" [resupply story]

-Daily News: "US steps up arms supply to enemy"

-some papers print reports of President Nixon meeting last Thursday with heads of oil companies, and the possibility of using US civilian planes or supply flights to Israel.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	telegram	Amemb Madrid to SecState	10/16/73	B
2	telegram	Amemb Jidda to SecState	10/16/73	B
3	report	Biographies	Aug. 1972	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

1174

FOLDER TITLE

8

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

NSC 5798

REFERRAL

Samuels
Fy

To: Mr. Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Date: October 18, 1973

ACTION REQUESTED

- ☒ Draft reply for:
☐ President's signature.
☐ Undersigned's signature.
☐ Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.
☐ Direct reply.
☐ Furnish information copy.
☐ Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
☐ Furnish copy of reply, if any.
☐ For your information.
☐ For comment.

NOTE

Prompt action is essential.

If more than 48 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately, Code 1450.

Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:

Description:

☒ Letter: ☐ Telegram: ☐ Other:
To: Dr. Kissinger
From: Kurt Waldheim
Date: Oct. 16, 1973
Subject: UN Sec. General writes to the President offering any UN assistance in settlement of the Middle East dispute and expresses his concern over the threat to international peace.

By direction of the President:

Alvin D. Crow
for Jeanne W. Davis

(Copy to remain with correspondence)

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

LOG NO.: *up to*

Date: October 17, 1973

Time: NSC 5798

FOR ACTION: Henry Kissinger

cc (for information):

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date:

Time:

SUBJECT:

Letter from Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General, United Nations, 10-16, re the Middle East

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ For Necessary Action

☐ For Your Recommendations

☐ Prepare Agenda and Brief

☐ Draft Reply

☐ For Your Comments

☐ Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

BAC
PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

BRUCE A. KEHLI
Staff Secretary



NSC 5798

WAR
10/1/6

16 October 1973

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Mr. President,

I have been following the developments in the Middle East with growing concern since fighting broke out on 6 October. I fully realize the very difficult problems which this development poses for your Government, and I have been encouraged by your efforts to reduce escalation and to maintain close contact with other governments with a view to avoiding a confrontation over the Middle East which might have most serious consequences for the world community. In this connexion, I wish to express to you, Mr. President, my appreciation for the continuous contacts which I have had with Secretary of State Kissinger in recent days.

As you may be aware, in my statement to the Security Council of 11 October I expressed my deep concern at the wider threat to international peace and security which developments in the Middle East might create. It is in this context that I am addressing this personal message to you. While I know that it is the firm policy of your Government to do its utmost to maintain peace and to encourage peaceful relations among Governments, other recent developments give grounds for great anxiety that the particular circumstances of the Middle East conflict may make this policy increasingly difficult to realize.

/...

The Honourable Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

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I have been impressed by the general desire that the United Nations should continue to assist in the search both for an end to the fighting and for a just and lasting peace in the area. I fully understand the reasons why it has been impossible until this time for the Security Council of the United Nations to take effective action either to put an end to the war in the Middle East or to bring about the just and lasting settlement which is required by the Council's own resolutions. I feel very strongly, however, that I, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, must take every possible opportunity to be of assistance in avoiding an escalation of the war and also in bringing all of the parties concerned to the point where a just and lasting settlement may at last be reached. In both of these aims, the position of your Government is crucial, and I am very confident of the wisdom and far-sightedness with which your Government will exert its influence.

The object of this letter is first to express my very grave concern at the present situation and its possible consequences for the future, and secondly to inform you that I, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, stand ready, as does my Special Representative to the Middle East, to be of assistance should our good offices or efforts be required.

I have addressed a similar letter to General Secretary Brezhnev.✓

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Kurt Waldheim
Secretary-General

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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October 16 1973

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Arab Foreign Ministers

You have agreed to see a delegation of four Arab Foreign Ministers at 11:00 Wednesday, October 17. The four are Saudi Arabia's Omar al-Saqqaf, Kuwait's Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and Morocco's Ahmed Taibi Benhima. There will be a French-speaking interpreter from the Department for the Algerian who does not speak English.

The Foreign Ministers initially requested this meeting with you in order to assure that the U.S. was aware at the highest level of Arab states' determination not to accept a ceasefire on the basis of the October 6 lines and to urge that the U.S. not become involved in the conflict or engaged in the resupply of Israel. In light of confirmation of our resupply effort to Israel, the Arab Ministers will now come with new instructions.

The primary purpose of your meeting is to demonstrate to the Arabs that we are prepared to listen sympathetically to their views and mean it when we say we are not pro-Israel or pro-Arab but pro-peace. We also want to get across to them that actions such as oil embargoes or breaks in diplomatic relations will not help them and only hamper our efforts to play an effective peacemaking role with the two sides.

Key Points

The key points that we suggest you convey to the Arab Governments are:

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GDS--DECLAS Dec. 31, 1981

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--the reasons which have compelled us to initiate a resupply effort to Israel;

--that no U.S. forces or personnel are engaged in the conflict;

--the desire of the U.S. to remain in close touch with Arab Governments and to work with them as soon as conditions permit to pursue vigorously efforts to secure a just and lasting peace in the area; and

--that the Arab countries cannot expect to pillory the United States or to take action against U.S. interests and at the same time expect the U.S. to play a role in achieving a settlement in the Middle East acceptable to them.

We anticipate that the Arab Foreign Ministers will wish to:

--express their governments' concern at the U.S. decision to resupply Israel with military equipment and warn that this could seriously jeopardize U.S. economic and other interests in the Arab countries, including their own;

--state that Arab objectives in the current fighting are limited to recapturing Arab territory lost to Israel in the 1967 conflict and do not include the destruction of Israel;

--urge that what is needed now is an early cessation of hostilities coupled with an Israeli commitment to withdraw from all territory occupied in the 1967 war.

Background

Three of the Foreign Ministers whom you will be meeting represent countries which have continued to maintain close political as well as economic relations with the U.S. since the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Although Algeria broke diplomatic relations with us at that time,

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TALKING POINTS

MEETING WITH ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS

OCTOBER 17 - 11:00 AM

1. Let me briefly review the record of our diplomatic efforts to date. In the few hour's warning we had before the outbreak of hostilities on October 6, we tried with the Soviets, the Egyptians, King Hussein, King Faisal, the UN Secretary General, and others to forestall hostilities. Although these efforts were unsuccessful, we have continued to pursue two objectives: to end the fighting and to create conditions which will make progress possible toward a final, just and lasting Arab-Israeli peace settlement

2. We have formulated no specific proposals or adopted any rigid positions in the UN. We wish a free give-and-take of ideas as the search for a Security Council consensus progresses. In recent days, we have made a major diplomatic effort to develop a consensus which would have brought an end to hostilities on the basis of the present disposition of forces. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been as cooperative as we would have desired in this effort. This is where the diplomatic situation stands today.

3. During the initial period of the crisis we exercised considerable restraint in shipment of further arms to the area of conflict. However, the Soviets have taken the initiative in launching a massive airlift of arms -- of over 300 flights so far -- and these are continuing at an increased pace. After repeated requests to the Soviets not to exacerbate this situation, we concluded that we had no alternative but to begin to resupply Israel. Let me stress here that as soon as an effective ceasefire has been achieved, we are prepared to stop our resupply operation provided that the Soviets do the same.

4. No United States armed forces or personnel are engaged in the current hostilities. Charges of such participation circulating abroad are irresponsible and without foundation.

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5. I recognize that the conditions which led to the outbreak of new hostilities on October 6 must be ended. The U.S. understands that the stated Arab goal is to regain territories occupied in 1967 and not to destroy Israel. The essential task at this time is that hostilities be brought to an end in such a way that a new ceasefire might lay the basis for renewed diplomatic efforts toward a final Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The U.S. is prepared to work vigorously for that objective. In the meantime, however, the U.S. resupply effort to Israel is necessary if we are to remain in a position to use our influence.

6. At the same time I consider it vitally important that the channels of communication between the U.S. and the Arab countries remain open. I have been in touch with both King Faisal and President Boumedienne since hostilities commenced October 6. We must remain in close touch with all our friends in the Arab world and consult with them: not only on ways in which the present fighting may be brought to an end but also on the means for resuming the interrupted quest for a peace settlement that meets the legitimate aspirations of all parties to the dispute, including the Palestinians.

7. I understand the depth of Arab feeling at this time. I am also concerned, however, that actions taken against U.S. interests in this emotional atmosphere could have the opposite effect of what the Arab Governments desire on opinion in this country. I hope that you and your governments will continue to exercise the greatest restraint in your own activities during this crisis and that you will counsel moderation and restraint on other Arab Governments as well so that the U.S. can continue to play a constructive role.

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
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it has continued to welcome the development of close economic ties. Saudi Arabia, of course, is the world's largest exporter of oil and continued availability of its oil to the U.S. and to Western Europe and Japan will be crucial to meeting the world's energy needs over the next several years. Kuwait and Algeria are also important oil exporting states.

All four of their governments have contributed token forces to the Egyptian or Syrian fronts. Nevertheless, the Saudis and Kuwaitis are also presently under considerable pressure from other Arab states to embargo oil shipments to the U.S. or to limit their overall production and exports as a means of influencing U.S. policy during the present crisis. A meeting of ministers from Arab oil producing states is scheduled to convene in Kuwait this week to discuss how their oil can be used in the present conflict. Besides oil, the U.S. also has other important economic and military communications interests in these countries. Among these are overflight and landing privileges for unarmed military aircraft in Saudi Arabia and a U.S. naval communications facility at Kenitra in Morocco which we use on the basis of an oral agreement with King Hassan. We wish to dissuade the Arab governments from taking action against these U.S. interests during the present crisis.

There are attached talking points for your use in your meeting with the Arab Ministers.


Henry A. Kissinger

Attachments:

1. Talking Points
2. Biographies (4)

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00
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L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 12183

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LF, IS, US
SUBJECT: LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEW RE US POLICY IN ME

SUMMARY: IN TOW-HOUR MEETING (HELD AT HIS REQUEST) WITH ME OCT 16, PRIMIN SOLH EXPRESSED IN FRIENDLY BUT VERY CONCERNED TONES HIS SORROW AND DISQUIET OVER SITUATION IN ME. HE OUTLINED ADVERSE EFFECT WHICH HE BELIEVES US STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS HAVE HAD ON THAT SITUATION AND VOICED FEAR THAT IF CURRENT TRENDS CONTINUE THEY WILL CAUSE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO ARAB-AMERICAN RELATIONS, US POSITION IN ME, AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN LEBANON. PRIMIN URGED USG ACT BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE TO ASSURE ARABS THAT US POLICIES ARE NOT TOTALLY DEVOTED TO SUPPORT OF ISRAEL AND ITS CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES, REGARDLESS OF JUSTICE OF ARAB CLAIMS. I ASSURED HIM USG ACTIONS AND DECLARATIONS MOTIVATED SOLELY BY DESIRE ACHIEVE EARLIEST POSSIBLE END TO HOSTILITIES AND OBTAIN RAPID PROGRESS TOWARD NEGOTIATED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

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1. PRIMIN OPENED MEETING WITH LENGTHY HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ME CONFLICT, NOTING THAT ARABS--AFTER STRIVING FOR DECADES TO RESIST FIRST EUROPEAN COLONIAL AND LATER ISRAELI DOMINATION OF ME--HAVE FINALLY MADE REAL STRIDES IN ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-RESPECT. SITUATION IN ME, HE SAID, WOULD NEVER BE THE SAME, REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME OF CURRENT HOSTILITIES, SINCE ALL MYTHS AND PREMISES FORMERLY ACCEPTED AS FACTORS IN ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE HAD IRREVOCABLY BEEN CHANGED AND EVEN REVERSED. WHILE EVENTS OF PAST TEN DAYS HAD COME AS SURPRISE TO MANY PEOPLE, ARABS ARE NOW UNITED, DEFIANT, CONFIDENT AND DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW CONTROL OF THEIR DESTINY SLIP FROM THEIR HANDS IN FUTURE.

2. IN THIS SITUATION, PRIMIN SAID, HE SADDENED AND DISTURBED BY SIGNS THAT USG CONTINUES ALLOW ITS ME POLICIES BE DICTATED BY OUTDATED ESTIMATES OF TRENDS AND CONDITIONS IN ARAB WORLD. HE SAW US ME POLICY SINCE 1948 AS CHAIN OF MISTAKES AND MISJUDGMENTS RESULTING FROM FAULTY ESTIMATES OF ARAB POTENTIALITIES AND OVER-RELIANCE ON ISRAELI POWER TO ACT AS GUARDIAN OF US INTERESTS IN ME. THIS MAY HAVE HAD LITTLE IMPACT OF US INTERESTS AS LONG AS ARABS REMAINED DIVIDED, CONFUSED AND RIDDLED WITH FEELINGS OF INFERIORITY, BUT EVENTS ARE NOW CONSPIRING TO ROB USG OF THESE ADVANTAGES. PRIMIN POINTED TO US POSITION IN SC (IN PARTICULAR US PROPOSAL FOR CEASEFIRE LINKED WITH RETURN OF FORCES TO ORIGINAL CEASEFIRE LINES), RECENT STATEMENTS BY PRES NIXON AND SECRETARY, AND US DECISION RE ARMS RESUPPLY TO ISRAEL AS INDICATIONS USG STILL DOES NOT APPRECIATE HOW MUCH CONDITIONS IN ME HAVE CHANGED AND HOW MUCH ITS INTERESTS IN ARAB WORLD ARE IN JEOPARDY.

3. PRIMIN ASKED USG TO IMAGINE HOW ARAB MAN-IN-STREET FEELS WHEN HE HEARS OF US ANNOUNCEMENT PROVIDE REPLACEMENT ARMS TO ISRAEL OR WHEN HE READS THAT US POLICY IN CURRENT HOSTILITIES IS AKIN TO ITS POLICIES RE LEBANON IN 1958 OR JORDAN IN 1970. HOW THEN CAN USG EXPECT PRESERVE ANY CREDIBILITY IN ARAB EYES--REGARDLESS OF THEIR IDEOLOGICAL ATTACHMENTS--BY SUPPLYING ARMS TO ISRAEL AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT? NOTING REFERENCE TO NEED

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TO PREVENT "DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL," PRIMIN ASKED WHAT USG CONSTRUED TO BE ISRAEL'S "DESTRUCTION." DID LOSS OF GOLAN OR SINAI ENTAIL "DESTRUCTION?" HE POINTED OUT NEITHER EGYPT NOR SYRIA, IN COURSE OF CURRENT HOSTILITIES, HAS VOICED AIM OF DESTROYING ISRAEL, THEIR SOLE GOAL BEING TO REGAIN TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967 WAR AFTER SIX YEARS OF FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN THEM BY PEACEFUL MEANS. USG, HE SAID, SHOULD NOT NOW CRITICIZE ARABS FOR RESORTING TO FORCE AFTER IT PROVED UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO INFLUENCE "ARROGANT, INTRANSIGENT" ISRAEL--DESPITE REPEATED ARAB CONCESSIONS RE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE AND READINESS TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH HER AS STIPULATED BY SC RES 242 -- TO GIVE UP OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN RETURN FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

4. PRIMIN NOTED THAT US POLICIES, HAVING LONG SINCE CAUSED ENMITY AND BITTERNESS AMONG RADICAL ARAB GOVTS, ARE NOW SADDENING AND EMBARRASSING THOSE ARABS WHO HAD STRIVEN MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH US. EVEN KING FAISAL, HE SAID, HAS BEEN OBLIGED ALLY HIMSELF WITH EXTREMIST SYRIANS AND IRAQIS IN CURRENT CONFRONTATION. IF RULER SO STRONG AND SECURE AS FAISAL MUST DO THIS, HOW CAN SUCH SMALL AND WEAK NATIONS LIKE LEBANON RESIST SAME TREND? PRIMIN NOTED ARAB EUPHORIA OVER RECENT MILITARY SUCCESSES AGAINST ISRAEL HAS SWEEPED UP NORMALLY PRO-WESTERN LEADERS ALL OVER ARAB WORLD. EVEN IN LEBANON, HE SAID, SUCH PEOPLE ARE TRANSFIXED BY SUCCESS ACHIEVED BY SAM MISSILES AND ARE BEGINNING TO ASK WHY GOL CANNOT NOW OBTAIN SIMILARLY EFFECTIVE ARMS IN ORDER DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST AN ENEMY WHO VIOLATES LEBANESE AIRSPACE WITH IMPUNITY. HE SAID ALL MEMBERS OF CABINET YESTERDAY WERE SUGGESTING LEBANON ACQUIRE SAM'S FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AGAINST ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS. SOLH FEARED US WAS RAPIDLY LOSING WHAT MIGHT BE LAST CHANCE TO PRESERVE ITS INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN ARAB WORLD FROM IRREPARABLE HARM. GOL SINCERELY WISHED AVOID BEING CAUGHT UP IN THE CONFLICT AND ENGAGING IN CONFRONTATION WITH US, HE SAID, BUT US POLICIES ARE RENDERING THIS PROSPECT INCREASINGLY LIKELY. IF USG HAS REASONS FOR ALLOWING THIS TO HAPPEN, WELL AND GOOD, BUT HE PERSONALLY COULD NOT COMPREHEND THEM.

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HE CONCLUDED BY REQUESTING I TRANSMIT HIS VIEWS TO
USG, HOPING AGAINST HOPE THAT WASHINGTON WOULD APPRECIATE
URGENT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE--IN THOUGHT AND DEED--SOME
UNDERSTANDING FOR ARAB VIEWPOINT AT THIS CRUCIAL STATE
OF ME EVENTS.

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00
AF-10 EUR-25 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20
ACDA-10 OPR-02 USSS-00 SY-10 UC-06 DRC-01 /162 W
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O P 161604Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 12183

5. I THANKED PRIMIN FOR FRANK EXPOSE OF GOL CONCERNS. I EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT CENTRAL PILLAR OF US ME POLICY REMAINS THAT OF PROMOTING JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF ME CONFLICT AND THAT OUR ACTIONS--INCLUDING OUR POSITION IN UNSC AND DECISION UNDERTAKE RESUPPLY OF ARMS TO ISRAEL-- ARE AIMED AT ACHIEVING THIS GOAL. I URGED HIM TO READ RECENT US OFFICIAL STATEMENTS IN THIS CONTEXT, NOTING PRES NIXON'S EMPHASIS ON DESIRE TO PLAY ROLE AS PEACEMAKER. I CALLED HIS ATTENTION TO EFFORTS OVER PERIOD OF MANY DAYS TO EXERCISE UTMOST CAUTION AND RESTRAINT IN US PRONOUNCEMENTS AND ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS CURRENT HOSTILITIES, BUT NOTED THAT SUCH RESTRAINT, DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS AND HOPES, HAD SADLY NOT BEEN MATCHED BY SIMILAR BEHAVIOR ON PART OF SOVS. MASSIVE SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO SYRIA AND EGYPT CONSISTING OF OVER 280 FLIGHTS WITH 4,000 TONS HAD FINALLY FORCED US ACT TO REDRESS MILITARY BALANCE IN ME. SUCH DECISION WAS SURELY A PAINFUL ONE AND AN ACT WHICH WE WOULD RATHER HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED TO TAKE BUT WHICH WAS ESSENTIAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. I ASKED WHETHER ANY FAIR-MINDED ARAB GOVT WOULD HAVE EXPECTED

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US TO STAND IDLY BY IN FACE SUCH SITUATION? SHOULD WE HAVE WAITED UNTIL SOVIET AIRLIFT REACHED 500 FLIGHTS OR 1,000 FLIGHTS? IT SEEMED TO ME WE HAD SHOWN GREATEST PATIENCE AND RESTRAINT. I POINTED OUT USG HAS DELIBERATELY DOWNPLAYED QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CURRENT HOSTILITIES, DESPITE FACT WE KNOW EGYPT AND SYRIA STARTED THEM, IN INTEREST OF MAINTAINING CLIMATE CONDUCTIVE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE STABLE AREA PEACE WHEN FIGHTING FINALLY ENDS. I ASSURED PRIMIN THAT ALTHOUGH OUR EFFORTS TO GAIN CEASEFIRE AND PRESERVE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT HAVE UNFORTUNATELY NOT PRODUCED MUCH PROGRESS THUS FAR, THOSE EFFORTS ARE CONTINUING AND WE REMAIN ALIVE TO VITAL NECESSITY OF ENSURING THEIR SUCCESS.

6. PRIMIN AGREED WITH ME THAT IT WAS FUTILE TO INDULGE IN RECRIMINATIONS OVER MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN SIX YEARS THAT FOLLOWED JUNE 1967. HE HOPED FUTURE EFFORTS TO GAIN IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES 242 WOULD PRODUCE BETTER RESULTS, SINCE OTHERWISE HE ENVISAGED CONTINUING DRIFT TOWARD VICIOUSNESS AND RECURRENT WAR IN ME, WITH US INTERESTS SUFFERING ALONG WITH PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED. TO MY REPLY THAT THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT WE ARE TRYING HARD TO AVOID, PRIMIN APPEALED FOR USG TO MAKE SOME PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION OF ITS DESIRE FOR JUST PEACE THAT DID NOT APPEAR TO ARABS AS HERE TACTIC DESIGNED TO SUPPORT ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES SEIZED IN JUNE WAR. TO HIS CONTENTION THAT NEITHER ARABS NOR SOVS REALLY DESIRED LIQUIDATION OF STATE OF ISRAEL, I ASKED HIM TO REFLECT WHETHER ANY ARAB LEADER--IN HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION IN WHICH ARAB ARMIES WERE ADVANCING VICTORIOUSLY THROUGH OCCUPIED TERRITORIES--WOULD BE ABLE TO STAND UP AGAINST PRESSURES FROM ARAB GOVTS AND MASSES FOR CONQUEST OF ISRAEL PROPER. PRIMIN DID NOT ANSWER MY QUESTION, REMARKING ONLY THAT RESUPPLY OF ARMS TO ISRAEL AT THIS JUNCTURE COULD ONLY BE CONSTRUED BY ARABS AS SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI RETENTION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

7. IN CONCLUSION, PRIMIN ASSURED ME GOL, AND HE PERSONALLY, WOULD SPARE NO EFFORT PROTECT US INTERESTS IN LEBANON,

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REGARDLESS OF FUTURE COURSE OF CURRENT HOSTILITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN ME. HE WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT POPULAR FEELING AGAINST US GENERATED BY WHAT ALL ARABS GENUINELY REGARD AS AMERICAN PARTIALITY TO ISRAEL IN RECENT DAYS IS "LAPPING AT MY DOOR" AND THAT POPULAR WRATH MIGHT SOON INCREASE TO POINT BEYOND ANYONE'S ABILITY TO CONTROL. HE AGAIN URGED IN STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS THAT USG MAKE SOME PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION OF ITS DESIRE TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL BALANCE BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAEL, SIMILAR TO MANNER IN WHICH WE HAVE INDICATED OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN MILITARY BALANCE. HE SUGGESTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT US NOW PUBLICLY REAFFIRM ITS PREVIOUS POSITION THAT DURABLE PEACE NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT, ON THE ONE HAND, ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967.

R. I THANKED SOLH FOR HIS PAST EFFORTS (WHICH IN RECENT DAYS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE AND STRENUOUS) TO PROTECT US INTERESTS HERE, AND ASSURED HIM THAT OUR POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENERGIES ARE BEING UTILIZED TO THE UTMOST IN CAUSE OF SECURING CEASEFIRE ON TERMS BEST CALCULATED TO FOSTER NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT CONCLUSION AT JUST AND STABLE PEACE IN ME. BUFFUM

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, PO
SUBJECT: LAJES FLIGHTS
REF: LISBON 3793

1. WE DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO ANY SQUABBLE WITH GOP OVER INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF 1951 AGREEMENT WHICH HAS SERVED US SO WELL IN PAST. NEITHER DO WE WISH TO FALL INTO SITUATION WHERE GOP FEELS OBLIGED TO REQUIRE US TO SEEK PRIOR ASSENT FOR TRANSIT RIGHTS FOR US MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

2. BECAUSE WE BELIEVE GOP MAY CHOKER ON PHRASE "NO RESTRICTION IS PLACED ON THE TRANSIT OF US MILITARY AIRCRAFT", (THE MOST LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 6 POSSIBLE) WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT YOU SUBSTITUTE THE PHRASE "THE TRANSIT OF US MILITARY AIRCRAFT IS AUTHORIZED".

3. HOWEVER, IF PORTUGUESE LIKE YOUR FORMULATION, YOU CERTAINLY FREE TO AGREE. SHOULD THEY PROPOSE ANY OTHER FORMULATION, WHICH YOU FEEL MAY RESTRICT OUR FUTURE OPERATIONS AT LAJES, YOU SHOULD REFER TO DEPARTMENT FOR APPROVAL. KISSINGER

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EUR:WSTABLER

PM/ISO - MR. STODDART
S/S-O: PP SARROS

ISA/EUR - COL. BOWEN

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AS-SADAT SPEECH BEGINS

Arabic speech Ground War

10/16

MIS1143 (EDITORIAL REPORT) CAIRO DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC AT 0900
THE CARRIES LIVE A SPEECH BY EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR AS-SADAT.
PRESIDENT AS-SADAT BEGINS BY SAYING THAT HE WILL CONCENTRATE
IN HIS SPEECH ON TWO POINTS: "WAR AND PEACE." HE BRINGS TO DEAL
WITH THE QUEST OF WAR. HE SAYS HE DOES NOT WANT TO BRAG
ABOUT THE VICTORIES ALREADY SCORED BECAUSE ALL "OUR TIME MUST BE
DEVOTED" TO MANY IMPORTANT THINGS AT HAND.

HE SAYS THAT 3 YEARS AGO TODAY, HE PLEDGED TO SPARE NO
EFFORT TO BRING THE NATION INTO "A SITUATION IN WHICH IT CAN
RISE TO THE LEVEL OF ITS ASPIRATIONS." HE SAYS HE PLEDGED TO SHOW
THAT THE 1967 SETBACK WAS AN EXCEPTION IN EGYPTIAN
HISTORY. HE SAYS THE PEOPLE ARE THE BASE AND AS LONG AS THE
CASE IT SOUND THEN EVERYTHING IS ALL RIGHT.

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HE SAYS THAT HE WAS AWARE OF RIFTS WITHIN THE ARAB RANKS BUT
HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE ARAB NATION WOULD KNOW HOW TO DECIDE ON
ITS PRIORITIES WHEN THE TIME CAME.

HE SAYS THAT THE ARMY COMMAND NOT "LOST ITS NERVE,"
IN 1967 AND HAD THE ORDER FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
WHOLE OF SINAI HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN, THE SITUATION WOULD
HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. AS-SADAT THEN EMBARKS ON HIS WORK WITH
"ABD AN-NASIR TO BUILD UP THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH, HE SAYS,
HAVE "PERFORMED A MIRACLE BY ANY MILITARY CRITERION."

HE SAYS THAT HE ORDERED THE ARMED FORCES TO REPLY TO
THE ENEMY AND CHECK HIS ARROGANCE, "IT SURPRISED THE ENEMY AND
MADE HIM LOSE HIS BALANCE." HISTORY WILL RECORD THAT THE
EGYPTIAN FORCES CROSSED A MAJOR WATER BARRIER, DESTROYED THE
STATIONER BAR-LEV LINE, AND ESTABLISHED BRIDGEBEADS WITHIN "JUST
THE FIRST 6 HOURS" OF THE WAR.

SPEAKING OF THE NORTHERN FRONT, HE SAYS "THE GREAT
SYRIAN ARMY IS FIGHTING ONE OF THE ARAB NATION'S MOST GLORIOUS
BATTLES," UNDER THE WISE COMMAND OF PRESIDENT HAFIZ AL-ASAD. HE
TELLS THE SYRIAN FORCES THAT THEY HAVE FULFILLED THEIR
PLEDGE. TOGETHER WITH OUR OTHER BROTHERS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO
FIGHT, THE PRESIDENT SAYS.

THE PRESIDENT TURNS TO THE QUESTION OF PEACE. HE RECALLS THE
REASONS THAT CAUSED PEACE TO BE LOST. OCCASIONALLY OUR ENEMY TALKS
OF PEACE, HE SAYS, "BUT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PEACE
OF AGGRESSION" AND PEACE BASED ON JUSTICE.

OUR ENEMY ERRED WHEN HE THOUGHT THAT TERROR WOULD HELP HIM TO
ACHIEVE THE PEACE HE WANTS. BUT THIS CALCULATION ORIGINALLY
FORMULATED BY BEN GURION PROVED TO BE FALSE. "THE PEACE OF FAITS
ACCOMPLIS CANNOT LAST," HE SAYS.

TODAY WE ASK THE ISRAELI LEADERS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE ISRAELI
SECURITY THEORY WHICH THEY CHAMPIONED FOR 25 YEARS,
HE SAYS. TODAY "OUR MILITARY FORCE CHALLENGES THEIR MILITARY
FORCE." "THEY ARE NOW CONFRONTING AN ATTRITION WHICH WE CAN
TOLERATE BETTER AND MORE THAN THEY CAN," AS-SADAT STRESSES. LET
THEM IN ISRAEL HEAR: "WE ARE NOT ADVOCATES OF ANNIHILATION AS THEY
CLAIM. OUR EGYPTIAN ROCKETS OF THE ZAFIR TYPE WHICH CAN CROSS
SINAI ARE NOW ON THEIR LAUNCHING PADS READY TO BE FIRED AT ONE
SIGNAL TO THE DEEPEST POINTS IN ISRAEL."

LET THE ISRAELIS REMEMBER WHAT I ALWAYS SAID: "AN EYE
FOR AN EYE, A TOOTH FOR A TOOTH, AND DEPTH FOR DEPTH."

HE THEN STRESSES: "WE ARE NOT FIGHTING TO COMMIT AGGRESSION ON
ANYBODY'S LAND." WE FOUGHT TO REGAIN OUR LANDS WE LOST IN
1967 AND TO REGAIN THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

(MORE)

IS OCT 1237Z SKIP/GFE

FBIS 34

FIRST ADD 33 (AS-SADAT SPEECH REPORT)

XXX THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

(TEXT) FURTHER ON, AS-SADAT SAYS EGYPT HAS NOW GAINED BOTH INTERNATIONAL RESPECT AND SYMPATHY, ALTHOUGH THE RESPECT IS THE MORE IMPORTANT.

HE SAYS THE FIRST DESIRE OF THE UNITED STATES IS A CEASE-FIRE AND RETURN TO THE PRE-6 OCTOBER LINES.]

US HE SAYS THAT AFTER OBSTRUCTING PEACE EFFORTS, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEGUN ASSISTING ISRAELI AGGRESSION BY A SPEEDY AIRLIFT OF ARMS TO ISRAEL. THIS DOES NOT FRIGHTEN US.

US HE THEN SAYS: "BROTHERS AND SISTERS, I HAVE THOUGHT OF SENDING PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON A LETTER IN WHICH I WOULD CLEARLY DEFINE OUR POSITION. BUT I HESITATED LEST THIS MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED. FOR THIS REASON, I HAVE DECIDED INSTEAD TO ADDRESS AN OPEN MESSAGE TO HIM FROM HERE. THIS IS A MESSAGE NOT DICTATED BY FEAR BUT BY CONFIDENCE. IT IS A MESSAGE THAT DOES NOT EMANATE FROM WEARINESS BUT FROM A GENUINE DESIRE TO PROTECT PEACE AND BOLSTER PEACE. I WISH TO TELL HIM CLEARLY THAT OUR AID IN THE WAR IS WELL KNOWN AND THERE IS NO NEED FOR US TO EXPLAIN IT AGAIN. IF YOU WANT TO KNOW OUR DEMAND FOR PEACE, THEN HERE IS OUR PEACE PLAN: *Open msg to Pres.*

1. WE HAVE FOUGHT AND WILL FIGHT TO LIBERATE OUR TERRITORIES WHICH THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION SEIZED IN 1967 AND TO FIND A MEANS TO RETRIEVE AND SECURE RESPECT FOR THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IN THIS RESPECT, WE UPHOLD OUR COMMITMENT TO THE UN RESOLUTIONS: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL (RESOLUTIONS--FBIS).

"2. WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE ON THE BASIS OF THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION TO THE PRE-2-JUNE 1967 LINES.

"3. WE ARE PREPARED, AS SOON AS THE WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THESE TERRITORIES IS COMPLETED, TO ATTEND AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE

AT THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH I WILL TRY MY BEST TO PERSUADE MY COLEAGUES, THE ARAB LEADERS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR RUNNING OUR CONFLICT WITH THE ENEMY, (TO ACCEPT--FBIS)."

(CORE)

IS OCT 1246Z SKIP/CG

FBIS 37

SECOND AND LAST ADD 35 (AS-SADAT SPEECH REPORT)

XXX ENEMY, (TO ACCEP.--FBIS)."

(EDITORIAL REPORT) "I WILL ALSO TRY MY BEST TO CONVINCE THE PALESTINE PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES ABOUT THIS SO THAT THEY MAY PARTICIPATE WITH US AND WITH THE CONCERT OF STATES IN LAYING DOWN RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR A PEACE IN THE AREA BASED ON THE RESPECT OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA.

"4. WE ARE READY AT THIS HOUR--INDEED AT THIS VERY MOMENT--TO BEGIN CLEAVING THE SUEZ CANAL AND TO OPEN IT FOR SMALL NAVIGATION SO THAT IT MAY RESUME ITS ROLE IN SERVING WORLD PROSPERITY AND WELFARE. I HAVE ACTUALLY ISSUED AN ORDER TO THE HEAD OF THE SUEZ CANAL AUTHORITY TO BEGIN THIS OPERATION ON THE DAY FOLLOWING THE LIBERATION OF THE EASTERN BANK OF THE CANAL. THE PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS FOR THIS OPERATION HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

"5. IN ALL THIS, WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY AMBIGUOUS PROMISES OR ELASTIC WORDS WHICH CAN BE GIVEN ALL SORTS OF INTERPRETATIONS AND ONLY WASTE TIME IN USELESS THINGS AND RESUME OUR CAUSE TO THE STATE OF INACTION, WHICH WE NO LONGER ACCEPT WHATEVER THE REASONS THE OTHERS MAY HAVE OR WHATEVER SACRIFICES WE HAVE TO GIVE. WHAT WE WANT NOW IS CLARITY: CLARITY IN AIMS AND CLARITY IN THE MEANS.

"BROTHERS AND SISTERS: WE HAVE SAID OUR WORD. I PRAY TO GOD ALMIGHTY THAT ALL WILL UNDERSTAND IT WITHIN ITS TRUE FRAMEWORK AND WILL SEE IT STRAIGHT AND WILL APPRAISE MATTERS RIGHTLY. THE PRESENT HOURS DEMAND THE COURAGE AND THE MINDS OF MEN."

NEAR THE END OF HIS SPEECH, AS-SADAT SAYS: WE GIVE "ONE WARNING AFTER ANOTHER TO GIVE EVERYONE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVISE (THEIR STANDS--FBIS), HOPING THEY WILL RETREAT. HOWEVER, WE ARE, GOD WILLING, CAPABLE, AFTER SAYING THE WORD AND GIVING NOTIFICATION AND WARNING, TO DEAL ONE BLOW AFTER ANOTHER. WE SHALL KNOW WHEN, WHERE AND HOW TO DO SO IF THEY WANT TO ESCALATE WHAT THEY ARE DOING.

"THE ARAB NATION WILL NOT FORGET THE FRIENDS OF THESE HOURS WHO STAND WITH IT. IT WILL NOT FORGET THE ENEMIES OF THESE HOURS WHO STAND WITH ITS ENEMY."

(ENDALL)

16 OCT 1303Z SKIP/66

EXDIS



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 806

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 08992 161235Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

116805

P 161204Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1590

SECRET ISLAMABAD 8992

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: XF, PK
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

REF: ISLAMABAD 8769

DEPARTMENT WILL BE SEEING SRF REPORT FORWARDED TODAY
UNDER NPR-1314, REGARDING REPORTED SUGGESTION BY
BHUTTO THAT PAK AIRMEN IN MIDDLE EAST BE ENCOURAGED
TO VOLUNTEER FOR SERVICE IN SYRIA. YOU WILL RECALL
THAT I RAISED WITH BHUTTO ON OCTOBER 9 THE POSSIBILITY
THAT GOP MIGHT ALLOW ITSELF TO BECOME ACTIVELY
EMBROILED IN CURRENT FIGHTING (REFTEL). BHUTTO
ASSURED ME THEN THAT HE WAS INTENT ON KEEPING PAK
SERVICEMEN OUT OF FIGHTING. IF RPT IF SRF REPORT IS
CORRECT, BHUTTO EITHER WOULD HAVE CHANGED HIS MIND OR
WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS THAN FULLY CANDID WITH ME.
THESE ARE POSSIBILITIES ON WHICH I RESERVE JUDGMENT.
SOBER

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

D/e



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 642

3

PAGE 01 ANKARA 08207 161125Z

11
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

NOOE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

116189

Z 161030Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1377

SECRET ANKARA 8207

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, PFOR, TU
SUBJ: SOVIET REQUEST FOR OVERFLIGHTS OF TURKEY

REF: ANKARA 8191

BEGIN SUMMARY: USSR HAS NOTIFIED TURKEY, UNDER MONTREUX CONVENTION PROVISIONS, OF ITS INTENTION TO SEND UP TO THIRTY AIRCRAFT TO BEIRUT, BAGHDAD AND ALEPPO, BEGINNING OCT 17, OSTENSIBLY TO CARRY "TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT". CITING PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, PAST TURKISH PRACTICES, AND TURKEY'S NEUTRAL STANCE IN MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, AMONG OTHER ARGUMENTS, TURKEY HAS IN EFFECT ASKED USSR TO RECONSIDER. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT'S AUTHORITY SOONEST FOR ME TO GO BACK TO BAYULKEN AND REITERATE USG CONCERN OVER PROPOSED SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS. END SUMMARY.

1. AT HIS REQUEST, I MET THIS MORNING, OCT 16, WITH FONMIN BAYULKEN AT HIS RESIDENCE. AKYAMAC, IN CHARGE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS IN MFA (AND ALL ACWATION MATTERS), WAS PRESENT, AS WAS FMB POL COUNSELOR.

2. BAYULKEN DISCUSSED ME SITUATION AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS (SEPTELS), BUT MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO INFORM ME

HOLDRIDGE
HORMATS
JORDEN
LEMAN
LEVINE
NEGROPONTE
ODEEN
RATLIFF
RONDON
V.I.G.
WALSH



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SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 08207 161125Z

THAT THE USSR ON OCT 15 HAD NOTIFIED THE TURKS OF THEIR INTENTIONS, UNDER THE MONTREUX CONVENTION, TO SEND UP TO THIRTY AIRCRAFT OVER TURKEY TO THE M.E. (I.E., ONE TO BEIRUT, 20-22 TO BAGHDAD, AND 7-8 TO ALEPPO, COMMENCING OCTOBER 17). ACCORDING TO SOVIET NOTIFICATION THESE PLANES WOULD BE CARRYING "TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT". (AKYAMAC SUBSEQUENTLY MADE CLEAR TO US THAT THESE WERE OSTENSIBLY CIVIL AIR FLIGHTS, WITH THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT BEING GIVEN AN AEROFLOT LABEL.)

3. BAYULKEN SAID THAT SINCE SUPPLYING THE OVERFLIGHT INFO TO ME OCT 15 (REFTEL) HE HAD AGAIN RECONFIRMED FROM THE APPROPRIATE TURKISH AUTHORITIES THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RPT NO UNAUTHORIZED OVERFLIGHTS OVER TURKEY SINCE HOSTILITIES BEGAN.

4. BAYULKEN THEN EXPLAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH UNDER ARTICLE 23 OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION CIVIL AIRCRAFT CAN FLY OVER TURKEY ON THE SINOP-ANKARA-SELIFKE CORRIDOR AND ALTHOUGH THE CONVENTION DOES NOT REQUIRE SPECIFICS ABOUT CARGO, IN TURKISH PRACTICE IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT NO EXPLOSIVES OR WAR MATERIALS SHOULD BE CARRIED WITHOUT SPECIAL PERMISSION FROM THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES. UP TO NOW BAYULKEN ADDED, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT RAISED OBJECTIONS TO THIS TURKISH PRACTICE (OF WHICH THEY WERE LAST REMINDED IN AUGUST 1972 WHEN THE SOVIET ADVISORS WERE LEAVING EGYPT).

5. BAYULKEN ALSO OBSERVED THAT REQUIREMENTS TO OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR TRANSPORT OF WAR MATERIALS AND EXPLOSIVES WERE CONTAINED IN: (A) ARTICLE 35(A) OF THE 1944 CHICAGO CONVENTION (TO WHICH THE USSR HAD BECOME A PARTY IN NOVEMBER OF 1970); AND (B) THE AUGUST 1967 BILATERAL CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR (ARTICLE 16 (7-8)). BAYULKEN DID NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT IN ACCEPTING THE AUGUST 1967 AGREEMENT THE SOVIETS HAD CAREFULLY RESERVED THEIR RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE ASX OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION.

6. BAYULKEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET NOTIFICATION HE, BAYULKEN, HAD OUTLINED THE FOREGOING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. HE ADDED TO THIS ARGUMENTATION THE CURRENT TURKISH POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE ME CONFLICT: (A) TURKEY WAS NEUTRAL, IN THE SENSE OF THE HAGUE AGREEMENTS, AND WOULD TAKE NO PART IN THE CONFLICT; (B) TURKEY SUPPORTS SC RESOLUTION 242; (C) TURKEY WOULD CONTINUE TO ACT SCRUPULOUSLY IN ACCORD

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SECRET

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WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS; BUT (D) TURKEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN CERTAIN HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS, SUCH AS SUPPLYING BLOOD OR MEDICINES.

7. FINALLY, BAYULKEN EXPLAINED, HE TOLD THE SOVIET AMB THAT THIS SERIES OF OVERFLIGHTS WOULD GIVE RISE TO MUCH SPECULATION AND INEVITABLY ALLEGATIONS THAT THE CARGOES WERE NOT SIMPLY "TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT". BAYULKEN SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIET AMB THAT, WHILE TURKEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET WORD THAT THESE PLANES WERE CARRYING ONLY TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, MANY CIRCLES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WOULD NOT BELIEVE THIS AND TURKEY WOULD BE THOUGHT TO BE VIOLATING ITS NEUTRALITY IN THE SITUATION. THEREFORE HE SAID IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO USE OTHER AIR CORRIDORS TO THE ME. IN ANY EVENT, HE HOPED FOR SOVIET RESTRAINT IN THE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS.

8. BAYULKEN FINISHED THIS PART OF HIS CONVERSATION BY SAYING TO ME HE COULD NOT PREDICT THE SOVIET RESPONSE, SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD INSIST ON EXERCISING THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE MONTREUX CONVENTION.

9. I SAID TO BAYULKEN THAT I APPRECIATED HIS CANDOR VERY MUCH AND I WOULD COMMUNICATE THIS INFO IMMEDIATELY TO MY GOVT. HOWEVER, I NOTED FLATELY THAT NO ONE IN THE WORLD WOULD BELIEVE THE CLAIM OF TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT AND CERTAINLY MY GOVT WOULD NOT. I ALSO NOTED THAT USG ALREADY WAS GOING TO MUCH INCONVENIENCE AT INCIRLIK TO PROTECT TURKISH NEUTRALITY AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR USG TO UNDERSTAND GOVT POLICIES WHICH APPEAR TO BE PLACING GREATER INHABITION ON THE USG THAN ON USSR.

10. I STRESSED THE STRONG HOPE THAT THE SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE AND THAT I BE ADVISED OF THE SOVIET RESPONSE WHICH BAYULKEN INDICATED WAS EXPECTED MOMENTARILY.

1. COMMENT: I WOULD LIKE TO GO BACK TO BAYULKEN LATER TODAY AND UNDERSCORE USG CONCERN BY SAYING THAT, UPON DEPARTMENT'S RECEIPT OF REPORT OF THE ABOVE CONVERSATION, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO SEE HIM AGAIN AND REITERATE USG CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY OF TURKEY'S PERMITTING OVERFLIGHTS DISCUSSED ABOVE AND OVER RESULTANT POTENTIAL DISCREPANCIES IN TREATMENT US AND USSR ACTIVITIES.

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WHILE THERE IS AN OBVIOUS LIMIT TO WHAT GOT IS PREPARED TO DO PHYSICALLY TO PREVENT SOVIET FLIGHT, SUCH AN APPROACH MAY STIFFEN TURKISH BACKBONE AND IF IT FAILS, AT VERY LEAST IT SHOULD PAVE FOR OUR SEEKING GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN USE OF INCIRLIK.

12. RE LATTER, WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE GETTING RESPONSE TO ANKARA 8194. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, FIRST C-5A IS NOW ON GROUND AT INCIRLIK.
MACOMBER

SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 35

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1200 EDT, Oct. 16, 1973

Military Situation

The fronts in Syria and Sinai remained relatively static this morning. Israel reportedly held back a Syrian-Iraqi attack on the Syrian front. The Israeli military spokesman said Israel had destroyed 50 Syrian tanks by noon.

Mrs. Meir told the Knesset today that Israeli forces were operating on the other side of the Suez Canal, but that she could give no details. Israel reportedly conducted naval operations against targets near Alexandria, while Egypt claimed to have launched missiles against Sharm al-Shaykh. Air activity continued on both fronts, with Israel claiming 6 Syrian and 2 Egyptian aircraft this morning.

We do not yet know whether Jordanian forces in Syria have been engaged in the fighting.

Estimated Casualties through October 15

DIA estimates casualties and material damage through October 15 as follows:

	Arabs	Israel
Personnel	17,000	3,300
Tanks	1,400	800
Aircraft	270	95
Ships	20	3

Arab Reaction to US Resupply

Arab reaction to US resupply of Israel has thus far been limited. Arab media have given prominent negative

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GDS - DECLASS Dec. 21, 1981

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coverage to reports of the resupply, as well as to the President's remarks of October 15 on the Middle East. Editorial comment has thus far been sparse, however. An anti-US campaign is apparently being mounted in Beirut. Loud-speaker trucks have circulated there broadcasting anti-US propaganda.

Sadat Speech

Sadat, speaking before the People's Assembly today, described Egypt's aims in what he called an "open message" to President Nixon. Sadat said Egypt was fighting to liberate the territory occupied by Israel in 1967 and for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Egypt would accept a cease-fire on the basis of immediate Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines, following which it would be prepared to attend an international peace conference at the UN. Sadat stressed that Egypt was not willing to accept ambiguous proposals. He also revealed that preliminary preparations for reopening the Suez Canal had been ordered.

Egypt could tolerate attrition better than Israel, Sadat maintained, but Egypt did not advocate annihilation. Egyptian rockets of the Zafir type were ready to be launched at any time at the depths of Israel, he said. Egypt, however, recognizing its responsibilities, had held back. "The US resupply effort does not frighten us," Sadat commented.

Soviet Request for Overflights of Turkey

The Turkish Foreign Minister has informed our Ambassador that the USSR has notified Turkey under the Montreux Convention of its intention to conduct 30 overflights beginning October 7 (one to Beirut, 20-22 to Baghdad, and 7-8 to Aleppo), to carry "technical equipment." Turkey, citing its neutrality in the current crisis, has asked the USSR to reconsider. Our Ambassador, pointing to our efforts to protect Turkish neutrality, expressed the hope that the overflights would not take place. We have authorized our Ambassador to go back to the Foreign Minister to underline our concern in an effort to stiffen the Turkish backbone on this issue.

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
-3-

Soviet Public Comments

According to an Embassy Moscow cable, Kosygin's remarks at an October 15 dinner for Danish Prime Minister Jorgensen sought to reconcile Soviet policy in the Middle East with a continued Soviet commitment to detente. Kosygin cautioned that enemies of detente were trying to revive the Cold War. The Soviet press, meanwhile, has played up the the Boumedienne communique as demonstrating Soviet support for the Arabs. Soviet media, while reporting the US resupply effort, also continued parallel emphasis on bilateral US-Soviet business as usual.

US Tourists in Egypt

We have chartered a Greek vessel, the Knossos, to take stranded US tourists out of Egypt. The ship is expected to arrive in Alexandria on Thursday morning, October 18, and remain for five hours.

APPROVED BY: 

OPERATIONS

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66
ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20
ACDA-19 IO-14 OMB-01 SAJ-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
DRC-01 /111 W ----- 124669

R 160800Z OCT 73E
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1206
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
USIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L DACCA 4607

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, BG
SUBJECT: BANGLADESH PERCEPTIONS OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

USIA FOR ISA

FROM CHARGE

REF: STATE 203865

1. WE HAVE HAD NO INQUIRIES FROM BDG OFFICIALS ABOUT USG RESUPPLY OPERATION. WE MIGHT NEVER HAVE UNLESS EGYPTIAN OR SOVIET EMBASSY PROMPTS THEM TO INQUIRE. NOR DO I CONSIDER IT USEFUL TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN DISCUSSING SUBJECT WITH BDG.

2. BDG POSTURE, ALBEIT ALL-OUT PRO-ARAB, HAS SO FAR CONFINED ITSELF TO EXCORIATION OF ISRAEL. OFFICIAL BDG PRONOUNCEMENTS UP TO NOW HAVE NOT CRITICIZED USG ROLE. AWAMI LEAGUE ORATORY AND

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BENGALIEE NEWS MEDIA, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE INDULGING IN RECKLESS DISSEMINATION OF MISCHIEVOUS AND OUTRAGEOUS LIES ABOUT US DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN WAR. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED AND DISCOURAGED AT THIS PERFORMANCE BUT IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT BDG WOULD ATTEMPT TO DAMPER IT.

3. I HAVE SIGNALLED TO MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL ALAM MY UNEASINESS OVER POTENTIALLY INFLAMMATORY EFFECT ON POPULAR EMOTIONS, RELATING IT TO EXPERIENCES OF LAST WINTER'S ASSAULTS ON USIS CENTERS. PAO HAS EXPRESSED SIMILAR CONCERN TO SECRETARY MTNINFO ABIDIN, IN RESPONSE TO QUERY WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAD BEEN ANY BDG POLICY GUIDANCE ISSUED ON COVERAGE ME EVENTS IN GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED MEDIA ABIDIN REPLIED NEGATIVELY.

4. ALAM AGREED TO SHARE MY THOUGHTS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BUT I DOUBT THEY WILL HAVE MUCH EFFECT. FONMIN, FONSEC, AND ALAM ARE PREOCCUPIED WITH PERPARATIONS FOR ALL THREE OF THEM TO ACCOMPANY PRIMIN MUJIR TO JAPAN, LEAVING DACCA TOMORROW. IN THEIR ABSENCE, MFA WILL BE SUPERVISED BY ADMINISTRATIVE ADDITIONAL FOREIGN SECRETARY (FAKHRUDDIN AHMED). MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES WILL BE ACTING PRIME MINISTER. IN SHORT, FOR THE NEXT WEEK THERE WILL BE NO DECISION MAKERS IN DACCA WITH WHOM TO CONDUCT MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

5. AS FOR PUBLIC ATMOSPHERE IN DACCA, EMBASSY SEES NO EVIDENCE THAT NEWS MEDIA'S EXTRAVANGES AND AWAMI LEAGUE DRATORY HAVE HAD ANY APPRECTABLE EFFECT ON MASS EMOTIONS. BENGALIEES NATURALLY WANT THEIR MUSLIM ARAB "BROTHERS" TO PREVAIL. THEY DO NOT YET SEEM DISPOSED TO MANIFEST THIS SOLIDARITY BY ASSAULTING US PRESENCE IN DACCA. FOR THE MOMENT WE ASSUME THEY WILL NOT BE SO AROUSED UNLESS AND UNTIL BDG AND/OR SOVIET EMBASSY DECIDES TO ORGANIZE (AND PAY FOR) ANTI-US DEMONSTRATIONS.

6. WE SHALL OF COURSE REPORT ANY CHANGE IN THIS CURRENT

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ASSESSMENT.
NEWBERRY

NOTE BY OCT: STATE REFERENCE INCORRECT.

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

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43
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SS0-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

119195

Z 0 161537Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY JDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5210
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DHAKRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE
USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

SECRET JDDA 4548

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS USINT CAIRO AND BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, SA, XF
SUBJECT: SAUDI WARNING TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

SUMMARY: SAUDI DEFORMIN HAS CALLED IN AMBASSADORS FROM
EEC TO WARN THEM THAT UNLESS THEY PLACE EFFECTIVE PRESSURE
ON US TO CHANGE ITS POLICY TOWARD PRESENT CONFLICT,
KING MAY RPT MAY HAVE TO DECREASE OIL PRODUCTION. SAG
POINTED OUT EEC STATES WOULD BE FIRST TO BE AFFECTED.
UK EMBASSY SOURCE FEELS WARNING MADE IN CONTEXT THAT
SAG RELUCTANT TO TAKE SUCH DRASTIC STEP. END SUMMARY.

01/3
ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORNATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V.I.G. _____
WALSH _____

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 04548 161629Z

1. UK EMBASSY COUNSELOR HAS INFORMED US THAT ALL AMBASSADORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF EEC WERE CALLED IN AT 1300 LOCAL TIME TODAY (1000Z) BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM MASHUD TO RECEIVE WRITTEN AIDE MEMOIRE FROM SAG. CONTENTS DEALT WITH POSITION SAG FOUND ITSELF IN AFTER RE-SUPPLY EFFORT BEGUN BY UNITED STATES HAD BECOME KNOWN.

2. AIDE MEMOIRE, ACCORDING TO COUNSELOR, HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO LONDON (AND PRESUMABLY OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS PER ADDRESSEES OF THIS TEL). MEMOIRE STATED SUCCINCTLY IN ARABIC THAT SAG WAS FACED WITH A NEED TO RESPOND TO THE AMERICAN RE-SUPPLY OF ISRAEL AND WISHED TO WARN THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMON MARKET THAT THE KING MAY FIND IT NECESSARY (ACTUAL WORD USED WAS "SAWFA" EXPRESSING INTENTION SLIGHTLY STRONGER THAN MAY) TO REDUCE OR DECREASE THE PRODUCTION OF OIL. IT WAS UP TO EEC STATES TO TRY TO GET US TO CHANGE ITS POLICY IN THE CONFLICT, PARTICULARLY ON SUPPLY OF ARMS AT THIS TIME TO ISRAEL. NOTE STATED THAT EUROPE WOULD BE FIRST TO BE AFFECTED BY ANY REDUCTION.

3. UK AMBASSADOR WAS ONLY MEMBER PRESENT TO RESPOND, SAYING THAT HE HAD TO RESERVE HIS GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THIS INITIATIVE. UK COUNSELOR SAID THAT MEETING HELD IN ATMOSPHERE OF DEEP REGRETS OF SAG IN TAKING THIS STEP IF IT CHOSE TO DO SO AND THAT DECISION WAS NOT YET FINAL AND IRREVOCABLE.

4. WE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT MINPET YAMANI AND HIS ABU DHABI COUNTERPART OTAYBI DEPARTED RIYADH FOR KUWAIT MEETING ON OCT 16.
AKINS

NOTE BY DC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO OR BAGHDAD.



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

SECRET 193

PAGE 01 ATHENS 07196 161553Z

3

43
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSN-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

118565

0 161525Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1236
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

SECRET ATHENS 7196

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, GR
SUBJ: RESUPPLY TO ISRAEL

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

REF: A. STATE 204562; B. 203818; C. ATHENS 7164 (NOTAL)

1. IN EVENT OCCASIONAL EMERGENCY LANDING OR "LOGISTICAL SUPPORT" ACTIVITY OCCURS, WE WOULD NOT FORESEE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM. IN THIS CONNECTION, RATIONALE OF PARA 3, REF B SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. HOWEVER, IF SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE OTHER THAN SPORADIC, PROBLEMS COULD DEVELOP. IN ORDER TO PERMIT EMBASSY TO UNDERSTAND AND MAKE BETTER-INFORMED COMMENT, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF "LOGISTICAL SUPPORT" (PARA 1, REF A) OUT OF GREEK FACILITIES MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN US RESUPPLY OPERATION.

2. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT IN VIEW OF SENSITIVITIES OF GOG RE USE OF GREEK FACILITIES TO REMIND GOG AT MILITARY/TECHNICAL LEVEL OF POSSIBILITY THAT EXTENSIVE RESUPPLY OPERATION MIGHT RESULT IN OCCASIONAL DIVERT OR EMERGENCY LANDING. CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY ALREADY HAS BEEN EXPRESSED BY GREEK MILITARY FOR US RESUPPLY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

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OPERATION TO ISRAEL, AND INFORMAL REMINDER OF THIS POSSIBILITY WILL PUT GREEK MILITARY IN BETTER POSITION TO JUSTIFY ANY SUCH OCCASIONAL EVENTS TO GOG. ACCORDINGLY, DAO WILL DO SO AT MY INSTRUCTION.

3. DESPITE POSITIVE VIEW OF USG POLICY IN CURRENT CRISIS HELD BY GREEK MILITARY, AND PROBABLY BY MOST GREEK LEADERS, AN EXTENSIVE USE OF GREEK FACILITIES IN RESUPPLY OPERATION WOULD SEEM DIRECTLY TO CONTRADICT GOG'S RECENT RESTATEMENT OF ITS POLICY ON USE OF GREEK FACILITIES, TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY ARE NOT RPT NOT BEING SO USED. GREECE MIGHT BE PLACED IN EXTREMELY AWKWARD POSITION VIS-A-VIS ARAB COUNTRIES IF ANY DEGREE OF REGULARITY OR FREQUENCY REPLACED SPORADIC, OCCASIONAL LANDINGS.

4. LOCAL MEDIA CAN BE EXPECTED TO SCRUTINIZE US ACTIVITIES WITH USUAL ILL-INFORMED ACUTENESS AND DOUBTLESS WILL FOCUS ON ANY VISIBLE MANIFESTATION OF UNUSUAL US ACTIVITY. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED, ONLY AFTER FACT OF POSSIBLE LANDING OF A RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, TO POINT OUT TO PRESS THAT EMERGENCY LANDINGS BY AIRCRAFT OF ANY NATION ARE COMMONLY MADE AT NEAREST AVAILABLE AIRFIELD.
TASCA

EXDIS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 885

(5)

PAGE 01 STATE 204600

3

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA TASK FORCE: HHSTACKHOUSE
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NEA:ALATHERTON
S/S-W NEWLIN

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
BATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

117035

Z 161256Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH

SECRET STATE 204600
EXDIS
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, PFOR, TU
SUBJECT: SOVIET REQUEST FOR OVERFLIGHTS OF TURKEY

D/B

REF: ANKARA 8207

STRONGLY ENDORSE TOUGH LINE YOU HAVE TAKEN. YOU SHOULD
APPROACH BAYULKEN ON LINES PARA 11 REFTTEL LAYING PARTI-
CULAR STRESS ON DISCRIMINATORY ASPECT IF TURKEY AGREES
TO SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS. KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. NEWLIN S/S-O.

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COPY *8/2/73*

S/S 7319504

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NSC 5770

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 16, 1973 *WQ*
Wav

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

In attempting to charter a Greek ship to remove several hundred American tourists from Egypt, where they have been stranded since the outbreak of hostilities, we learned that commercial companies have ceased issuing war risk insurance for vessels entering the war zone decreed by the Egyptian Government. Our immediate problem has been solved; we now have a charter with a Greek company to sail into Alexandria on October 18 with the company assuming the responsibility of obtaining whatever insurance is available.

In discussing possible future need of a vessel for evacuation in more critical circumstances, our Mission in Cairo asked that steps be taken to permit the U.S. Government to underwrite the insurance for such a voyage.

The Department of Commerce has authority to issue the necessary insurance to agencies of the Government designated by the President. The Department of State is not now so designated; the attached proposed memorandum for the Secretary from the President would permit us to obtain the necessary coverage from the Department of Commerce.

Thomas R. Pickering
Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

Attachment: (1) Proposed Memorandum for the Secretary
from the President

PROPOSED MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

In accordance with Title 46 of the United States Code section 1285, I hereby approve the procurement by the Department of State from the Secretary of Commerce of any of the insurance provided for in subchapter XII of Title 49 of the United States Code and prescribe that the Department of State is an agency authorized to obtain such insurance without premium by agreement to indemnify the Secretary of Commerce against all losses covered by that insurance.

Richard Nixon



War
10/16
Department of State

COPY _____ OF 15 COPIES

Quinn Tamm

SECRET

Z 103527Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO FLASH 0000
BT
SECRET STATE 204576

CONTROL: 4 1 6 6 Q

RECD: 16 OCTOBER 73 -

2 11 AM

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, XF, NATO
SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

REF: USNATO 4919, STATE 204565

attached

1. YOU AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ONLY REPEAT ONLY ON PARAS 2 THROUGH 5 AND 9 OF STATE 203685 FOR OCTOBER 16 COUNCIL MEETING.

2. YOU SHOULD THEN FORCEFULLY MAKE POINT THAT, WHILE WE WERE ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN ARMS SUPPLY EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL WAS THEN ON DEFENSIVE, SOVIETS UNDERTOOK MASSIVE AIRLIFT OF ARMS TO ARAB COUNTRIES; AS OF OCTOBER 15 NUMBER OF SOVIET FLIGHTS TO EGYPT, SYRIA AND IRAQ NUMBERS MORE THAN 300. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT USG VIEWS SOVIET AIRLIFT VERY SERIOUSLY AND HAS INITIATED RAPID RESUPPLY OPERATION TO ISRAEL. WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN MILITARY BALANCE IN MIDDLE EAST AND ARE NOT GOING TO REMAIN PASSIVE IN FACE OF THIS SOVIET ADVENTURISM- WE BELIEVE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE INTEREST IN STANDING FIRM WITH US, AND WE LOOK TO OUR NATO PARTNERS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS IN DAYS AHEAD TO ESTABLISH MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM AND BRING END TO FIGHTING ON BASIS WHICH WILL OPEN POSSIBILITIES FOR DIPLOMACY LOOKING TOWARD A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. YOU MAY INFORM COUNCIL U.S. WILL CONTINUE INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS TO THESE ENDS.

3. EUROPEANS SHOULD UNDERSTAND WE ARE GOING TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT SOVIET RESUPPLY TIPPING MILITARY BALANCE. THEY SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT POSITIONS AND ATTITUDES THEY TAKE IN THIS CRISIS CANNOT HELP BUT HAVE EFFECT ON OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS. PRESENT CRISIS IS TEST OF EVOLVING SPIRIT OF DETENTE, AND WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET. EUROPEANS HAVE JUST AS MUCH AT STAKE AS WE DO IN PERSUADING THE SOVIETS OF THIS FACT.

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Department of State

SECRET

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4. COMMENT: WE WANT YOU TO TAKE A STIFF, TOUGH LINE IN THE COUNCIL. WE ARE TRYING TO REDUCE THE INCENTIVE FOR SOVIET ADVENTURIST TACTICS OF WHICH IF THEY SUCCEEDED, EUROPE WOULD EVENTUALLY BE THE VICTIM. WE DO NOT WANT YOU TO BE DEFENSIVE ABOUT ACTIONS WE ARE TAKING TO RESUPPLY ISRAEL.

5. FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR GUIDANCE AND YOU MAY DRAW ON IT IN MAKING COMMENTS.

A. WE ARE DISTURBED BY EUROPEAN STATEMENTS IMPLYING THAT EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONSTITUTE A FAILURE OF THE U.S.-SOVIET "DETENTE" AND CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT AGREEMENTS. IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY FAILURE OF DETENTE OR SOVIET VIOLATION OF COMMITMENTS, IT INVOLVES NOT ONLY THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP BUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USSR AND ALL THOSE WESTERN NATIONS WHICH IN RECENT YEARS HAVE PURSUED A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND HAVE SIGNED VARIOUS AGREEMENTS WITH IT. FOR US THE OPERATIONAL ISSUE AT PRESENT IS, HOWEVER, NOT WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE VIOLATED SOME COMMITMENT, BUT HOW ALL THE ALLIES TOGETHER CAN HOLD THE SOVIET UNION TO THE KIND OF CONDUCT ALL OF US SEPARATELY AND JOINTLY HAVE ESTABLISHED AS THE STANDARD FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE DO NOT TAKE KINDLY TO EUROPEAN SUGGESTIONS THAT THE U.S. WAS FOOLISHLY DRAWN INTO DETENTE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE USSR AND MUST NOW USE THOSE SAME RELATIONSHIPS TO DEAL WITH THE USSR OVER THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. WE DO NOT WELCOME EUROPEAN PRO- NOUNCEMENTS FINDING THE SOVIETS IN VIOLATION OF U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENTS WHEN ANY SUCH VIOLATION APPLIES EQUALLY TO UNDERSTANDING THAT THE EUROPEANS HAVE WITH THE USSR.

B. WE HAVE NEVER VIEWED DETENTE AS A STATIC POLICY THAT COMES ONE DAY AND DISAPPEARS THE NEXT. THE ONLY SENSIBLE MEANING OF DETENTE IS TO USE IT AS AN INSTRUMENT

TO PROTECT OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND AS A MEANS TO RESTRAIN SOVIET EFFORTS TO DAMAGE THEM.

C. IN OUR VIEW, WHAT WE NEED TO CONSIDER NOW AS AN ALLIANCE IS HOW WE CAN COORDINATE OR HARMONIZE A SET OF POLICIES THAT WILL CONFRONT THE SOVIETS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE TO ITS OWN INTERESTS IF THEY CHOOSE TO DAMAGE OURS. THE U.S. CAN, OF COURSE, TAKE ACTIONS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State
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ALONE; BUT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE IN THE SPIRIT OF THE ALLIANCE AS JUST SET FORTH ELOQUENTLY IN THE VARIOUS SUBMISSIONS FOR THE YEAR OF EUROPE DECLARATION. THE ALLIANCE CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF HARMONIZING DETENTE POLICIES SHOULD NOW, IF THE ALLIES AGREE, BE TRANSFORMED INTO A CONSENSUS FOR USING THOSE POLICIES IN A CRISIS SITUATION.

D. AMONG THE ACTIONS THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER TOGETHER ARE:

--A SLOWDOWN OR EVEN SUSPENSION OF WESTERN PARTICIPATION IN CSCE AS AN INCONGRUOUS EXERCISE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES;

--ECONOMIC MEASURES IN SUCH AREAS OF EXPORT CONTROLS, CREDITS, ETC.

--COMMON PRESSURES ON HUNGARY AND YUGOSLAVIA IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR ACTIVE ROLE IN THE PROLONGATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR BY DIRECT AND INDIRECT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS FROM THE OUTSET OF THE FIGHTING.

--A REVIEW OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS, SUCH AS THE U.S.-SOVIET PRINCIPLES AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AGREEMENT, FRENCH-SOVIET PRINCIPLES AND CONSULTATIONS AGREEMENTS, ETC., WITH A VIEW TO UNDERTAKING A COMMON EFFORT TO HOLD THE USSR TO THE TERMS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS.

--ANY OTHER IDEAS PROPOSED BY LUNS AND THE ALLIES.

E. WE WISH TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WHILE U.S. HAS TAKEN UNILATERAL ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SUPPLIES FOR ISRAEL, WE CONSIDER PRESENT SITUATION MAJOR TEST FOR THE ALLIANCE. HOW THIS TEST IS MET WILL BE OBSERVED WITH GREATEST CARE BY SOVIETS, EAST EUROPEANS, ARABS AND OTHERS. THE U.S. CONGRESS IS FOUND TO TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN DEALING WITH MATTERS RELATED TO THE ALLIANCE. (KISSINGER
BT

NOTE: HANDLED AS NODIS PER MR. WRIGHT S/S-O.

DRAFTED BY: TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE.

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCE: S/S-O:R. WRIGHT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 085

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-10 AF-10 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00
USTE-00 USSS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20
ACDA-19 IO-14 SAJ-01 INRE-00 MC-02 DRC-01 EURE-00
/145 W

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Z 152000Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2141

S E C R E T USNATO 4919

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81
TAGS: PBOB, MOPS, XF, NATO
SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT

REF: A) USNATO 4909, B) USNATO 4843, C) USNATO 4787
D) STATE 203685, E) STATE 203698

SUMMARY: SYG LUNS HAS CALLED RESTRICTED AND UNPUBLICIZED
COUNCIL MEETING FOR 11:00 AM OCTOBER 16 TO DISCUSS, ON AN
INSTRUCTED BASIS, NATO IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT,
SPECIFICALLY:

A) THE CHANCES OF EXTENSION OR ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT
AND THE EFFECT ON ALLIED COUNTRIES; AND

B) THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS,
PARTICULARLY ON "DETENTE." ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE,
TOGETHER WITH AUTHORIZATION TO DRAW UPON REF D IN ADVANCE OF
WASHINGTON PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. DECISION TO MOUNT
MILITARY RE-SUPPLY OPERATION TO ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

1. AT SPECIAL MEETING OF POLADS OCTOBER 15, CHAIRMAN KASTL

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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REFERRED TO SACEUR MESSAGE TO MC CHAIRMAN IN WHICH GENERAL GOODPASTER POINTED TO SPREADING EFFECTS OF THE MIDDLE-EAST SITUATION AND REQUESTED AN URGENT OVERALL POLITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION WHICH EMPHASIZED THE RANGE OF IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO GENERALLY AND THE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE SPECIFICALLY.

2. KASTL SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST SYG LUNS HAD CALLED RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 16 AT WHICH LUNS HOPED PERMREPS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ON AN INSTRUCTED BASIS:

A) THE CHANCES OF EXTENSION OR ESCALATION OF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT AND THE EFFECTS OF SUCH EXTENSION OR ESCALATION ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE AND ON THE ALLIANCE COLLECTIVELY;

B) THE EFFECT OF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY ON "DETENTE"; AND

C) A REVIEW OF THE OIL SUPPLY SITUATION AS IT STANDS NOW AND AS IT MIGHT BE PROJECTED IF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT IS PROTRACTED.

3. WITH REGARD TO QUESTION (C), KASTL SAID THAT A NATO STUDY WILL BE CIRCULATED ON THE 15TH OR 16TH WHICH WILL PROVIDE MUCH OF THIS INFORMATION. KASTL SAID THE EMPHASIS OF TOMORROW'S COUNCIL MEETING SHOULD THEREFORE BE ON TOPICS (A) AND (B).

4. KASTL SPECULATED THAT THE COUNCIL MIGHT DECIDE ON A ROLE FOR POLADS IN ON-GOING DISCUSSION OF THESE MIDDLE-EAST SUBJECTS. HE REFERRED TO THE MANNER IN WHICH POLADS OPERATED DURING THE CZECH CRISIS OF 1968 ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THE TWO SITUATIONS WERE DIFFERENT. KASTL THOUGHT THAT IN THE PRESENT MIDDLE-EAST SITUATION A POLADS CHAIRMAN'S REPORT TO THE SYG, RATHER THAN AN AGREED POLADS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, MIGHT BE IN ORDER. LUNS COULD THEN TRANSMIT THIS REPORT TO MC UNDER A PO.

5. KASTL ASKED IF ANY MEMBERS WISHED TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE MIDDLE-EAST DEVELOPMENTS TODAY. TURKISH REP INDICATED HE HAD READ THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND USSR WERE NOW TALKING ABOUT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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
PAGE 03 NATO 04919 152033Z

POSSIBILITIES OF ORGANIZING A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE. THE TURKISH REP INQUIRED IF THE U.S. REP HAD ANY INFORMATION. THE U.S. REP REFERRED TO FULL WIRELESS FILE TEXT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S OCTOBER 12 PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ALL DELEGATIONS.

6. CANADIAN AND UK REPS QUESTIONED TO WHAT EXTENT THE COUNCIL COULD DISCUSS THE ASSIGNED SUBJECTS IN A MEANINGFUL WAY GIVEN THE LACK OF AUTHORITATIVE MILITARY ASSESSMENTS. THE CHAIRMAN REFERRED TO A PROGRAM OF MILITARY BRIEFINGS FOR PERMREPS WHICH WAS GOING INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY.

7. COMMENT: THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS TO THIS CALL FOR A COUNCIL DISCUSSION AND POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT. FIRST, THERE IS NATURAL AND JUSTIFIED CONCERN ON THE PART OF MILITARY COMMANDERS AND INDIVIDUAL ALLIED NATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE SEEMS TO BE A CERTAIN THRUST GENERATED BY LUNS AS TO THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF NATO IN THE EVOLVING MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS. SOME OF OUR IS CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT A FULL COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS, PARTICULARLY ONE WHICH MIGHT SEEK TO ARRIVE AT A CONSENSUS, IS LIKELY TO BE AN UNPRODUCTIVE AFFAIR SINCE THERE ARE BOUND TO BE OBJECTIONS FROM FRANCE, POSSIBLY FROM THE U.S. AND OTHERS TO SUCH AN EXERCISE. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT KASTL IS SPEAKING IN TERMS OF A CHAIRMAN'S REPORT RATHER THAN AN AGREED POLADS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL. ACTION REQUESTED: I BELIEVE U.S. SHOULD ADOPT FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE AND PROVIDE LEADERSHIP IN COUNCIL DISCUSSION TOMORROW AND BEYOND. THIS WOULD HELP THE U.S. TO GUIDE NATO DISCUSSIONS, INFLUENCE THINKING IN ALLIED CAPITALS AND SHAPE, AND SPECIFICALLY THE ASSESSMENT SACEUR HAS REQUESTED. WE WILL NEED GUIDANCE BEFORE TOMORROW'S MEETING (SEE REFTELS). IF WE REPORT THAT WE ARE WITHOUT GUIDANCE, THAT FACT COULD EXACERBATE SUSPICIONS ABOUT U.S.-SOVIET DEALINGS ON WHICH THE ALLIANCE IS INTENTIONALLY BEING KEPT UNINFORMED. I ALSO REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO DRAW UPON STATE 203685 TO INFORM COUNCIL BEFORE PUBLIC CONFIRMATION IN WASHINGTON OF U.S. DECISION TO RE-SUPPLY ISRAEL.
RUMSFELD

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISG-00 SSG-71 CCO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 USSS-00 CIAE-00 OODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

ACDA-10 ID-15 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 MC-02 /172 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.: HLK

10/14/73 EXT 20454

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

NEA:MR. SISCO - WH:GEN. SCORCROFT

ST:AMB MCCLOSKEY - ID:AMB POPPER

S/S:MR. PICKERING - S/S:MR. SAGROS

102217

150042Z OCT 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NOUAKHOUT IMMEDIATE

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 243685

INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 11652 - GDS

TAGS: XX, PFOR

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

*US policy - to all
posts*

FOR AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES FROM THE SECRETARY

1. THIS MESSAGE IS TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON OUR POLICY EFFORTS AND STRATEGY IN CURRENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND ON REASONS FOR OUR DECISION TO MOUNT MILITARY RESUPPLY OPERATION TO ISRAEL. AT SUCH TIME AS HOST GOVERNMENT BECOMES AWARE OF RESUPPLY OPERATION AND WE CONFIRM FACT HERE TO PRESS, YOU MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING IN EXPLAINING OUR POLICY IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES FROM HOST GOVERNMENT

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Department of State

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OFFICIALS.

2. FROM BEGINNING OF WAR OCTOBER 6, ONCE OUR ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES HAD FAILED, OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO TWO OBJECTIVES: TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL MAKE PROGRESS POSSIBLE TOWARD A FINAL JUST AND LASTING ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE.

3. TO THESE ENDS WE (A) TOOK THE INITIATIVE ON OCTOBER 7 TO CONVENE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, (B) HAVE HELD INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHERS, AND (C) EXERCISED RESTRAINT DURING INITIAL PERIOD OF CRISIS IN SHIPMENT OF FURTHER ARMS TO AREA OF CONFLICT.

4. IN ADDRESSING SECURITY COUNCIL OCTOBER 7, AMBASSADOR SCALT STATED THE PRINCIPLES WE BELIEVE SHOULD GOVERN ANY SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IN PRESENT CRISIS. WE HAVE MADE NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHILE FREE GIVE-AND-TAKE OF IDEAS IN SEARCH FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS GOES FORWARD.

5. MILITARY SITUATION IS INCONCLUSIVE, WITH ISRAELI SALIENT INTO SYRIA 20 MILES FROM DAMASCUS AND EGYPTIAN BRIDGEHEAD UP TO 10 MILES EAST AT SUEZ CANAL. BOTH SIDES HAVE SUSTAINED HEAVY LOSSES OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT.

6. IN PAST THREE DAYS, I HAVE MADE MAJOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO DEVELOP CONSENSUS WHICH WOULD HAVE BROUGHT END TO HOSTILITIES ON BASIS OF PRESENT DISPOSITION OF FORCES. SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN FAILURE THESE EFFORTS TO DATE IS THAT SOVIETS HAVE NOT COOPERATED AS MUCH AS WE WOULD HAVE DESIRED IN EFFORT TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES.

7. IN ADDITION, SOVIETS TOOK INITIATIVE IN LAUNCHING MASSIVE AIRLIFT OF ARMS, AND NUMBER OF FLIGHTS HAS NOW REACHED 200. AFTER REPEATED REQUESTS TO THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO EXAGGERATE THE SITUATION, THE USSR CONCLUDED IT HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO BEGIN RESUPPLY AIRLIFT TO ISRAEL, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS BEGAN ONLY AFTER SOVIET RESUPPLY EFFORT HAD REACHED

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

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MASSIVE PROPORTIONS. IF EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IS ESTABLISHED, WE ARE PREPARED TO STOP OUR AIRLIFT PROVIDED SOVIETS DO THE SAME.

8. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONDITIONS THAT LED TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR MUST BE ENDED AND WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK TO THAT END. WE VIEW THIS RESUPPLY EFFORT AS NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO REMAIN IN POSITION TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO WORK FOR JUST AND LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT. I HAD ALREADY INITIATED EFFORTS TO THAT END DURING BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT UNGA IN NEW YORK WHEN CURRENT HOSTILITIES ERUPTED.

9. FINALLY, WE WANT TO MAKE CATEGORICALLY CLEAR, IN LIGHT OF NUMBER OF IRRESPONSIBLE CHARGES ABOUT PARTICIPATION OF U.S. FORCES IN CURRENT HOSTILITIES, THAT THERE IS NO REPEAT NO INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES OR PERSONNEL IN THIS FIGHTING. KISSINGER

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War
Quadrant

CONTROL: 4161Q
RECD: 16 OCT 73 1AM

0 160411Z OCT 73 ZFFA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9944
BT
SECRET STATE 204575

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CW, EG, IS
SUBJ: US DECISION RESUPPLY ISRAEL

REF: A STATE 203685
B. BONN 14866

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. YOU SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT SOONEST WITH FONMIN SCHEEL TO EXPLAIN RATIONALE AND URGENCY US DECISION RESUPPLY ISRAEL. FACT IS THAT THIS WAS DECISION WE DID NOT WISH TO TAKE, ONE FORCED ON US BY MASSIVE SOVIET RESUPPLY EFFORT. RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL IS ESSENTIAL IF MIDDLE EAST BALANCE TO BE MAINTAINED. WE FULLY INTEND DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO THIS END, WHILE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS SEEK AN END TO FIGHTING AND INDUCE SOVIETS TO SHOW GREATER DEGREE COOPERATION. IN THIS CRITICAL TIME, UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT OF ALLIES IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND WE WOULD WELCOME SUCH SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING FROM FRG.

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM SCHEEL THAT RESUPPLY INVOLVES SOME DRAWDOWN FROM INVENTORIES OF US FORCES IN FRG, AND THAT MOVEMENT OF THIS MATERIEL HAS ALREADY BEEN INITIATED. IN SO DOING, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT SPEED WITH WHICH OPERATION HAD TO BE MOUNTED PRECLUDED FURNISHING INFO EARLIER TO FRG. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FRG IS EQUALLY INTERESTED WITH US IN SECURING PEACE IN MID-EAST, AND THAT WE CAN COUNT ON FRG UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION AS RESUPPLY EFFORT PROCEEDS. IF PRESSED ON MAGNITUDE AND TYPE OF MATERIEL BEING MOVED FROM FRG, YOU SHOULD SAY YOU DO NOT HAVE DETAILS AS YET. ASSERTIONS MADE BY EGYPTIANS (REFTEL B) ABOUT TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL FROM FRG TO ISRAEL, AND ABOUT ALERT MEASURES IN DARMSTADT AND HEIDELBERG AREAS, ARE WITHOUT FOUNDATION AND YOU MAY SO INFORM SCHEEL.

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PAGE -2- STATE 204575, OCT 16

3. COMMENT: YOU SHOULD NOT BE DEFENSIVE ABOUT THIS
MATTER. WE INTEND TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY AND
EUROPEANS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY
HAVE AN INTEREST WITH US TO ASSURE THAT SOVIET
ADVENTURISM DOES NOT WORK. YOU SHOULD ALSO GET ACROSS
IN MANNER YOU DEEM DESIRABLE THAT ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY
EUROPEANS IN THIS CRISIS IS BOUND TO AFFECT OUR FUTURE
RELATIONS. KISSINGER

www

DRAFTED BY: EUR/CE:SGEORGE

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCE: EUR:MR.STABLER

S/S:

S:LEAGLEBURGER

DOD/ISA:GEN. SUMNER (INFORMED)

DOD/ISA:BGLOBDEL (INFORMED)

S/S-O:PPSARROS

NEA:MR.ATHERTON

EUR:MR.STOESSEL

PM:MR.BROWN

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War
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 750

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ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 ISG-00 CIAE-00 DODF-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USTA-15 ADDA-19 IO-14 OMB-01 CDO-00 SSG-00 INRE-00

NSCE-00 USSS-00 NEA-10 EUR-25 DRC-01 MC-02 /168 W
----- 118606

R 161508Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0649

CONFIDENTIAL TRIPOLI 1332

F. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, LY

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION TO M.F. SITUATION

1. 2300 HRS ARAB LANGUAGE NEWS ON OCT 15 CARRIED BRIEF STORY ON THE PRESIDENT'S OCT 15 REMARKS HEADLINED "AMERICAN PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES THAT U.S. MIGHT INTERVENE MILITARILY TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF ISRAEL." THE STORY REPORTED PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON SIMILARITY BETWEEN USG POSITION IN 1973 AND THAT ADOPTED IN LEBANON IN 1958 AND JORDAN IN 1970. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE STORY CONCENTRATED MORE ON THE LANDING OF MARINES IN LEBANON THAN IT DID ON THE CONSISTENCY OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF MIDDLE EASTERN STATES, BOTH ARAB AND ISRAELI. OFFICIAL FAJIR AL-JADID ON OCT 16 HAD FRONT-PAGE, BUT NOT PROMINENT, ARTICLE HEADLINED "NIXON ANNOUNCES PROBABILITY OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE ENEMY." PIECE WAS SUB-HEADLINED "AMERICANS CONFIRM CONTINUED FLOW OF ARMS TO THE ENEMY."

2. BOTH RADIO AND NEWSPAPER STORIES SURPRISINGLY LOW KEY. THEY INCLUDED STRAIGHT REPLAY OF WIRE SERVICE REPORTS OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT TRANSITING THE AZORES

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TRIPOL 01332 161505Z

EN ROUTE TO ISRAEL. FAJIR AL-JADID REPORTED THAT AMERICAN OFFICIALS LINKED THE U.S. RESUPPLY DECISION WITH THE SOVIET "BUILDING OF AN AIR BRIDGE" IN ORDER TO SUPPLY ARAB BELLIGERENTS.

3. STRONGEST ANTI-AMERICAN PIECE IN FAJIR AL-JADID WAS INSIDE PAGE 3 ARTICLE ON "DAMASCUS IS STEADFAST." THE SERIAL NUMBER PLATE FROM AN ISRAELI PHANTOM WAS DISPLAYED WITH UNITED STATES NAVY MARKINGS AND THE LEGEND "MANUFACTURED BY AMERICAN ELECTRIC INC., LA MIRADA, CALIFORNIA, U.S. PROPERTY." THE PHOTOGRAPH WAS CAPTIONED "THIS IS EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME, AMERICA".

4. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY LOCAL (PALESTINIAN) MAN-ON-THE-STREET REACTION ALSO NOT YET EMOTIONALLY ANTI-AMERICAN. IN FACT, LACK OF STRONG OFFICIAL REACTION TO ARMS SUPPLY ANNOUNCEMENTS HAS BEEN ADDED TO LIST OF ARGUMENTS USED BY THOSE WHO BELIEVE QADHAFI IS AN AMERICAN AGENT.
JOSIF

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 TRIPOL 01333 161627Z

45
ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 SS-20 EUR-25 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00
INRE-00 USIE-00 USSS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03
ACDA-19 ID-14 MC-02 SAJ-01 DRC-01 /147 W
***** 118943

O R 161548Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0650
INFO USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 1333

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, OGEN
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

REF: STATE 203889

1. CIRCUMSTANCES, TENOR AND CONTENT OF MCCLOSKEY'S STATEMENT OF OCT 15 RE ARMS RESUPPLY WERE RELATIVELY FAVORABLE, WE ESTIMATE. CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDED PRIOR FEATURING BY BRC OF REPORTED STATEMENT BY SOVIET AMB AT BEIRUT THAT SYRIA BEING PROVIDED A FANTASTIC NEW WEAPON BY USSR.
2. LOCAL PRESS PLAY ON MCCLOSKEY STATEMENT IS FACTUAL, SO FAR. ASSUME SADAT ADDRESSING SUBJECT TODAY AND LARG REACTIONS MAY ECHO HIS.
3. DO NOT ANTICIPATE BEING CALLED DOWN TO MFA AGAIN SO SOON AFTER ITS OCT 14 PROTEST AND WARNING ON THIS AND RELATED SUBJECTS. ALL LOCAL PUBLICITY ON THAT DEMARCHE, INCLUDING TV CLIP, WAS OF COURSE 100 PER CENT ON WHAT LARG HAD TO SAY, NOT WE. AS THINGS

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PAGE 02 TRIPOL 01333 161627Z

PRESENTLY STAND, NEXT SUMMONS SHOULD BE FOR NOTICE OF HOW LARG FOLLOWING THROUGH ON ITS WARNING, BUT WE DOUBT IF THEY HAVE MADE UP THEIR MINDS YET ON THE MODE OF REPRISAL, IF ANY. IT MAY EMERGE AT OAPED MEETING IN KUWAIT.

4. WOULD PREFER AT THIS POINT TO LET RECORD STAND AS IT IS RATHER THAN ASK FOR APPOINTMENT TO MAKE DEMARCHE OUTLINED STATE 203684. HAVE MADE MANY OF THE POINTS ALREADY, OCT 14, IN REPLY TO LARG PROTEST. ALSO FEEL THAT OUR INTERESTS HERE BETTER PRESERVED BY A LOW PROFILE THAN BY TAKING INITIATIVE TO JUSTIFY OUR WAYS. NO LARG OFFICIAL COULD POSSIBLY CONCEDE OUR ARGUMENTS ANYWAY.
JUSIF

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WAR
TELEGRAM

SECRET 762

PAGE 01 STATE 205068

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ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 FUR-25 ISO-00 AF-10 IO-14 ACDA-19 CIAE-00

DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 SY-10

USSS-00 OPR-02 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 /155 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:OAKORN:JMCDONNELL:JFC

APPROVED BY NEA/TASK FORCE - MR. STSC0

NEA - MR. ATHERTON

NEA/FX - MR. DAVIS

EUR/NE - MR. FLOYD

S/S-O - R. ELTZ

121704

N 162142Z OCT 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

CINCUSNAVEUR IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 205068

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AMER, LE

SUBJECT: UK INQUIRY RE EVACUATION FROM LEBANON

1. BRITISH EMBASSY OFFICER (REEVES) CALLED AT DEPARTMENT OCT. 16 TO SAY FOREIGN OFFICE HAD BEEN CONSULTING WITH US EMBASSY LONDON AND CINCUSNAVEUR RE POSSIBLE EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT. REEVES SAID BRITISH HAD BEEN TOLD THAT IF US EVACUATES ITS CITIZENS FROM LEBANON THIS WILL PROBABLY BE DONE BY SEA. REEVES SAID BRITISH THOUGHT US CAPABILITIES IN RESPECT TO SEA EVACUATION IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN PROBABLY GREATER THAN THEIRS. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO ASK WHETHER IN EVENT EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM LEBANON, US WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE ALL OR PART OF BRITISH COMMUNITY AS WELL.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 STATE 205068

2. DEPARTMENT OFFICER SAID OUR E & E PLANS CALL IN FIRST INSTANCE FOR EVACUATION BY CHARTERED COMMERCIAL AIRLINERS VIA BEIRUT AIRPORT. WE WOULD CONSIDER SEA EVACUATION ONLY IF AIRPORT INACCESSIBLE, AND WE VIEW IT AS POOR ALTERNATIVE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE MANY DIFFICULTIES.

3. IN ANY FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR PRIMARY RELIANCE ON COMMERCIAL CHARTER; SUGGEST THAT BRITISH LOOK AT SIMILAR MOVEMENT PLAN USING UK CHARTERS. EMBASSY MAY ASSURE FOREIGN OFFICE THAT IN EVENT COMMERCIAL CHARTERS SHOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE WE WOULD

OF COURSE BE READY TO CONSULT AND COORDINATE WITH UK TO EXTENT SITUATION PERMITS.

4. EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE CLEAR USG IS NOT REPEAT NOT PLANNING EVACUATE AMERICANS FROM LEBANON AT THIS TIME. KISSINGER

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SECRET 025

PAGE 01 ANKARA 08217 162348Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

P 161900Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1384

SECRET ANKARA 08217

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, PFOR, TU

SUBJ: SOVIET REQUEST FOR OVERFLIGHTS OF TURKEY

REFS: (A) STATE 204600 (B) PAKA 11, ANKARA 8207

1. PURSUANT REFTELS, I MET AGAIN THIS EVENING (OCT 16) WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BAYULKEN. I ADVISED HIM THAT, IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF MY REPORT OF OUR CONVERSATION EARLIER IN THE DAY THE DEPARTMENT HAD BY RETURN TELEGRAM INSTRUCTED ME TO CALL ON HIM AGAIN TO REITERATE USG CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY OF TURKS PERMITTING THE OVERFLIGHTS WE HAD DISCUSSED IN THE MORNING AND TO EMPHASIZE OUR CONCERN OVER POTENTIAL RESULTANT DISCRIMINATION AS BETWEEN US AND USSR ACTIVITIES. BAYULKEN AT FIRST DIVERTED CONVERSATION WITH (A) LENGTHY EXPOSITION OF TURK POPULATION'S ("WHICH IS 99.1 PERCENT MOSLEM") SYMPATHY FOR ARAB CAUSE BECAUSE THEY WERE FIGHTING TO REGAIN LOST TERRITORIES OF 1967, (B) REPETITION OF ALL HIS BASIC VIEWPOINTS REGARDING CURRENT ME SITUATION WHICH I HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.

2. WHEN I BROUGHT HIM BACK TO THE SUBJECT AT HAND, HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: (A) THAT, DESPITE TURK POPULATION'S SYMPATHY FOR ARABS, GOT HAD TAKEN ADAMANT NEUTRAL POSITION; (B) THAT HE SHARED USG'S CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE OVERFLIGHTS AND HAD DONE WHAT HE COULD TO HEAD THEM OFF; (C) THAT MONTREUX CONVENTION WAS "OPEN" (IN THE SENSE THAT IT DID NOT GIVE TURKEY

ANDERSON _____
HO'DRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
O'DEN _____
KATLIF _____
RONDON _____
SANDERS _____
SUNNEFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

122457

M 3

✓D/B

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CLEAR RIGHT TO BAR SUCH FLIGHTS) AND THIS WEAKENED TURKEY'S POSITION IN THIS SITUATION. I RESPONDED THAT THROUGH AGREEMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE MONTREUX CONVENTION, WHICH HE HAD MENTIONED THIS MORNING, AND ON BASIS OF TURKISH PRACTICE WHICH SOVIETS ON EARLIER OCCASIONS HAD ACQUIESCED IN, TURKEY HAD ESTABLISHED BASIS ON WHICH TO OBJECT TO AND PREVENT SUCH FLIGHTS. BAYULKEN SAID THAT THIS WAS TURKISH POSITION, BUT HE HAD NOT YET HAD REPLY FROM SOVIETS, AND, OF COURSE, THEIR VIEWPOINTS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT FACTOR.

3. I SAID I RECOGNIZED IT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR, BUT NOT THE CONTROLLING ONE--THAT THE CONTROLLING ONE WAS WHAT TURKEY THOUGHT AND, AS I UNDERSTOOD FROM WHAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SAID TO ME, TURKEY'S POSITION WAS CLEAR THAT FLIGHT CARRYING ARMS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED. I SAID TURKEY HAD A REPUTATION FOR NOT KNUCKLING UNDER TO

FRIENDS AND FOES ON MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE TO WHICH THEY ATTACHED IMPORTANCE, AND I HOPED THEY WOULD FIND A WAY TO AVOID DOING SO ON THIS OCCASION.

4. BAYULKEN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO GETTING AWAY FROM FACT THAT MONTREUX CONVENTION WAS A SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE DOCUMENT AND THEN NOTED THAT THIS FLEXIBILITY HAD BEEN EMPLOYED BY TURKEY TO USG ADVANTAGE WHEN WE WISHED TO PASS CERTAIN MISSILE-CARRYING DESTROYERS THROUGH STRAITS.

5. I POINTED OUT THE OBVIOUS DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO SITUATIONS AND NOTED THAT, IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS TURKEY WHICH HAD MADE BASIC DECISIONS IN THE US-TURKISH CASE, JUST AS I ASSUMED IT WOULD BE TURKEY WHICH WOULD MAKE THE DECISION IN THE USSR-TURKISH QUESTION ABOUT OVERFLIGHTS.

6. THE CONVERSATION THEN WAS CONCLUDED WITH MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS OF HOPE THAT THE PROBLEM COULD BE RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY.

7. COMMENT: WHILE BAYULKEN WAS NON-COMMITTAL, HE DID

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TRY TO CONVEY TO ME IN THIS MEETING THAT HE WAS DOING
THE BEST HE COULD TO PREVENT THE OVERFLIGHTS. I
RELIEVE THE UNDERSCORING OF OUR CONCERN THROUGH THIS
SECOND MEETING WAS USEFUL, ESPECIALLY AS WE UNDERSTAND
THAT THIS MATTER WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TOMORROW.
MACOMBER

NOTE BY OCT: EXDIS ADDED PER MISS ELTZ S/S-O.

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War
TELEGRAM

10/16

0 161920Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2154
BT
S E C R E T USNATO 4937

CONTROL: 4 4 4 8Q
RECD: 16 OCT '73 6:48PM

NODIS

*NATO - Rumsfeld gives
US line (not bad)*

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOC, MOPS, XF, NATO
SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT:
NAC MEETING OF OCTOBER 16, 1973

REF: A) STATE 204576 NODIS, B) USNATO 4919; C) STATE 203897;
D) STATE 203685

BEGIN SUMMARY: AT RESTRICTED OCTOBER 16 NAC, AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD OUTLINED U.S. ACTIONS TO DATE IN THE MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS AND CALLED UPON NATO PARTNERS FOR COORDINATION OF POLICIES SO THAT TOGETHER WE MIGHT HOLD THE SOVIET UNION TO THE KIND OF CONDUCT ALL OF US HAVE ESTABLISHED AS THE STANDARD FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ALLIES RECEIVED U.S. PRESENTATION WITH GREAT INTEREST AND WITH A RENEWED EMPHASIS ON ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. ALLIES DISAVOWED ANY INTENTION OF VIEWING U.S.-USSR DETENTE AS SEPARATE FROM SOVIET-EUROPEAN DETENTE. INSTRUCTED CONSULTATIONS ON THE U.S. INITIATIVES SHOULD BEGIN IN THE COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 17. END SUMMARY.

1. LUNS SAID MEETING WAS OCCASIONED BY REQUEST OF OCTOBER 14 FROM GENERAL GOODPASTER (SACEUR) FOR A POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR AND CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO (REF B). HE SUGGESTED THAT BEST MECHANISM FOR RESPONDING WOULD BE A REPORT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL KASTL ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH LUNS WOULD FORWARD IN REPLY.

2. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) SAW DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING A POLITICAL ASSESSMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A DAILY MILITARY ASSESSMENT THAT WOULD ADDRESS SUCH QUESTIONS AS: COULD U.S. REINFORCEMENT OF 2,000 MARINES IN THE MED GIVE RISE TO AN ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT? LUNS THOUGHT COUNCIL COULD TAKE NOTE OF CERTAIN FACTS AND PREDICT CONSEQUENCES. RUMSFELD ASKED THAT NAC REVIEW KASTL'S REPORT BEFORE SYG FORWARDED IT TO SACEUR. LUNS AGREED.

3. DE ROSE (FRANCE), REMARKED THAT LIKE THE U.S., HE TOO WANTED TO SEE KASTL'S REPORT IN THE COUNCIL BUT SINCE THERE WAS A NEED FOR QUICK RESPONSE, WONDERED WHETHER REPORT SHOULD BE COUNCIL'S AS OPPOSED TO KASTL'S. DE ROSE SAID A COUNCIL

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-2- USNATO 4937, 16 OCT'73

REPORT MIGHT BE DELAYED WHILE HE WAS WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS. LUNS IN REPLY CITED PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN 1968 CZECH CRISIS WHEN REPORTS WERE PREPARED UNDER PROSIO'S RESPONSIBILITY AND "LOOKED AT" BY COUNCIL; OTHERWISE, ENORMOUS DELAYS COULD ENSUE. THIS SOLUTION REPRESENTED A COMPROMISE BETWEEN A COUNCIL REPORT AND REPORT BY LUNS HIMSELF. NAC VOICED NO OBJECTION TO THIS PROCEDURE.

4. RUMSFELD THEN MADE INITIAL STATEMENT DRAWN FROM REFS A AND D (SEE TEXTS SEPTTEL) OUTLINING U.S. ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, AND CALLING FOR ALLIED UNITY AND SUPPORT OF U.S. ACTIONS TO PREVENT THE MASSIVE SOVIET AIRLIFT OF ARMS TO ARAB COUNTRIES FROM TIPPING THE MILITARY BALANCE. LUNS ECHOED RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT, SAYING THAT ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY WAS MORE IMPORTANT NOW THAN EVER AND COMMENTING THAT HE SENSED A U.S. PREOCCUPATION WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ALLIANCE DISUNITY.

5. DE STAERCKE COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. STATEMENT PUTS THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL. THIS REPRESENTED A GOOD BEGINNING, AND HE HOPED OTHER STATEMENTS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. DE STAERCKE AGREED THAT ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY WAS FUNDAMENTAL AND HE SAW NO INFRACTIONS; NO "SPECIAL" DETENTE EXISTED BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR. INSTEAD, HE CONSIDERED DETENTE TO BE "GLOBAL" BUT AFFECTED BY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. U.S. HAS A SPECIAL ROLE BECAUSE OF ITS POWER. DE STAERCKE CHARACTERIZED AS IMPORTANT THE STATEMENT BY THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE RECENTLY THAT DETENTE HAD NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY MIDDLE EAST WAR.

6. TO THE U.S., DE STAERCKE ASKED IF DETENTE WILL BE AFFECTED. BREZHNEV WAS QUOTED AS SAYING DETENTE IS IRREVERSIBLE, AND CAN GO ON. DOES U.S. AGREE? BELGIUM IS CARRYING OUT A DETENTE POLICY, SAME AS U.S.; BUT THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IS FUNDAMENTAL BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR.

7. CONCLUDING, DE STAERCKE SAID U.S. SHOULD BE FIRST TO SAY IF DETENTE IS AFFECTED, AND UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. KEEPING ALLIANCE INFORMED. FINALLY, HE REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON U.S. POLICY (REF C) AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED LEBANON AND JORDAN, ASKING: WHAT WILL THIS POLICY HAVE AS A CONSEQUENCE?

8. DE ROSE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO COMMENT FURTHER ON THE U.S. STATEMENT AFTER HIS GOVERNMENT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE IT. HE WAS SURE HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. STATEMENTS ON SOLIDARITY. PERSONALLY HE SAW A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOLIDARITY ON MEANS AND SOLIDARITY

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-3- USNATO 4937, 16 OCT'73

ON ENDS. DE ROSE TOOK SPECIAL NOTE OF THE U.S. STATEMENT THAT IT IS U.S. INTENTION TO MAINTAIN MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM IN THE FACE OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WONDERED HOW FAR THIS WOULD GO, IN THE U.S. VIEW. HE NOTED AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD HAD SAID THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION OF INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES OR PERSONNEL, BUT THE QUESTION STILL REMAINED AS TO EXACTLY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT.

9. REFERRING TO THE EXPRESSED U.S. AIM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, TO PUT AN END TO THE CONFLICT IN A MANNER THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO LASTING PEACE, DE ROSE SAID ALL ALLIES AGREE WITH THESE AIMS AND NO ALLIES DOUBTED U.S. INTENTIONS. THE ONLY QUESTION WAS WHETHER THESE AIMS WILL BE ACHIEVED BY THE ANNOUNCED U.S. ACTIONS.

10. RUMSFELD NOTED REFERENCES TO STATEMENTS ON DETENTE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND STATED EXACT TEXTS WERE AVAILABLE. ALLIES SHOULD NOTE THAT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN EVOLVING AND STATEMENTS SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD WITH REFERENCE TO THE TIME AND THE DATE THEY WERE MADE. RUMSFELD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. IS SUPPLYING THE NATO SITUATION CENTER WITH CURRENT U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND ASSESSMENTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. OTHERS ARE CONTRIBUTING TOO. ALLIES HAVE MILITARY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON WHICH TO BASE ASSESSMENTS, HE SAID.

11. AS TO THE POSITION OF THE USG AT THIS MOMENT, THE ALLIES NEED NOT SEEK ELSEWHERE FOR IT. RUMSFELD SAID THE U.S. POSITION IS AS HE IS STATING IT NOW, AND IT IS ON THIS POSITION WE ARE OFFERING TO CONSULT.

12. RUMSFELD THEN PICKED UP THE DE STAERCKE COMMENT ABOUT DETENTE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE USSR AND MADE HIS SECOND STATEMENT (SEE SEPTTEL) WHICH CLARIFIED AND RE-EMPHASIZED THE U.S. VIEW OF DETENTE AS AN INSTRUMENT TO PROTECT THE COMMON INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE AND WHICH SUGGESTED HOW THE ALLIANCE NEEDS NOW TO COORDINATE A SET OF POLICIES THAT WILL CONFRONT THE SOVIETS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS IF THEY CHOOSE TO DAMAGE OURS.

13. ON CONCLUSION OF RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT, LUNS HASTENED TO INTERJECT "WE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DO NOT DISSOCIATE OUR DETENTE FROM THAT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR. IT IS ALL ONE AND THE SAME THING." LUNS SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT ALL THE ALLIES FELT THIS SAME WAY.

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14. FRG REP (KRAPP) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR RUMSFELD'S "VERY INTERESTING AND VALUABLE SECOND STATEMENT." HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS A MAJOR TEST OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, AND HE SAID EACH MEMBER SHOULD EXAMINE ALL OF ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE SOVIETS TO SEE WHAT EACH CAN DO.

15. DE STAERCKE SAID THAT CONSULTATION WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF SOLIDARITY AND THAT ONE ASPECT OF CONSULTATION WAS THE POSSIBILITY TO CONTRADICT. DE STAERCKE EXPOUNDED ON THE NECESSITY FOR CONSULTATIONS AND SAID THAT HARD QUESTIONS MUST BE ADDRESSED -- "ARE WE ON THE EVE OF ANOTHER CUBAN CRISIS?" "IN WHICH DIRECTION ARE WE READY TO GO IF THE SITUATION BECOMES WORSE?"

16. RUMSFELD SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS PUT BEFORE THE COUNCIL A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT SUBJECTS FOR CONSULTATION. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THE COUNCIL COULD BEGIN INSTRUCTED COMMENTS UPON THEM ON OCTOBER 17.

17. THE GREEK REP (CHORAFAS) POINTED TO THE NEED FOR MAKING SOME DETERMINATION AS TO WHAT SOVIET INTENTIONS WERE AT THIS TIME. THE DANISH REP (SVART) AGREED BUT SAID THERE WAS A QUESTION AS TO WHAT EXTENT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ABLE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS AT THE PRESENT TIME. LUNS COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET AIRLIFT AND SOVIET APPEALS TO ARABS TO JOIN THE WAR INDICATED SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE.

18. LUNS INQUIRED WHAT MIGHT BE SAID TO THE PRESS ABOUT TODAY'S NAC. IT WAS AGREED THAT IF ASKED THE NATO SPOKESMAN WOULD CONFIRM THAT THERE WAS A MEETING. IF ASKED HE WOULD CONFIRM THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WAS DISCUSSED. HE WOULD GO NO FURTHER.

19. DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT AS DESIRED.
RUMSFELD

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FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2155
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SECRET USNATO 4936

CONTROL: 4 4 2 1Q
RECD: 16 OCT'73 5:49PM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, XF, NATO
SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT: STATEMENTS BY
AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD AT OCTOBER 16 NAC

REF: STATE 204576

FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF TWO STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD
AT THE OCTOBER 16 NAC. DEPARTMENT DISTRIBUTE AS DESIRED.

BEGIN TEXT:

AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S FIRST STATEMENT

TALKING POINTS

NAC - OCTOBER 16, 1973

1. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR ON OCTOBER 6, ONCE OUR ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES HAD FAILED, OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO TWO OBJECTIVES: TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL MAKE PROGRESS POSSIBLE TOWARD A FINAL JUST AND LASTING ARAB-ISREALI PEACE.
2. TO THESE ENDS WE (A) TOOK THE INITIATIVE ON OCTOBER 7 TO CONVENE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, (B) HAVE HELD INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHERS, AND (C) EXERCISED RESTRAINT DURING INITIAL PERIOD OF CRISIS IN SHIPMENT OF FURTHER ARMS TO THE AREA OF THE CONFLICT. IN ADDRESSING THE SECURITY COUNCIL OCTOBER 7, OUR AMBASSADOR STATED THE PRINCIPLES WE BELIEVE SHOULD GOVERN ANY SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IN THE PRESENT CRISIS. WE HAVE MADE NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHILE FREE GIVE-AND-TAKE OF IDEAS IN SEARCH FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS GOES FORWARD.

3. WHILE WE WERE ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN ARMS SUPPLY EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL WAS THEN ON DEFENSIVE, THE SOVIETS UNDERTOOK A MASSIVE AIRLIFT OF ARMS TO ARAB

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COUNTRIES; AS OF OCTOBER 15, SOVIET FLIGHTS TO EGYPT, SYRIA AND IRAQ NUMBER MORE THAN 300.

4. THE USG VIEWS THIS SOVIET AIRFLIFT VERY SERIOUSLY AND HAS INITIATED A RAPID RESUPPLY OPERATION TO ISRAEL. AS HAS BEEN NOTED, THE MILITARY SITUATION IS STILL INCONCLUSIVE. BOTH SIDES HAVE SUSTAINED HEAVY LOSSES OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT. WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE-EAST AND ARE NOT GOING TO REMAIN PASSIVE IN THE FACE OF THIS SOVIET ADVENTURISM.

5. AT THIS POINT LET ME MAKE ONE THING CATEGORICALLY CLEAR, IN THE LIGHT OF A NUMBER OF IRRESPONSIBLE CHARGES ABOUT PARTICIPATION OF U.S. FORCES IN CURRENT HOSTILITIES: THERE IS NO REPEAT NO INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES OR PERSONNEL IN THIS FIGHTING.

6. WE BELIEVE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN STANDING FIRM WITH THE U.S., AND WE LOOK TO OUR NATO PARTNERS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS IN THE DAYS AHEAD TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM AND TO BRING AN END TO THE FIGHTING ON A BASIS WHICH WILL OPEN POSSIBILITIES FOR DIPLOMACY LOOKING TOWARD A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO THESE ENDS.

7. I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTED COMMENT DIRECTLY TO EACH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED HERE. WE ARE GOING TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE SOVIET RESUPPLY FROM TIPPING THE MILITARY BALANCE. THE POSITIONS AND ATTITUDES OUR NATO ALLIES TAKE IN THIS CRISIS CANNOT HELP BUT HAVE AN EFFECT ON OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS. THE PRESENT CRISIS IS A TEST OF THE EVOLVING SPIRIT OF DETENTE, AND WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET. EACH OF YOU HAS JUST AS MUCH AT STAKE AS WE DO IN PERSUADING THE SOVIETS OF THIS FACT.

8. WE ARE DISTURBED BY STATEMENTS IMPLYING THAT EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONSTITUTE A FAILURE OF THE U.S.-SOVIET "DETENTE" AND CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT AGREEMENTS. IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY FAILURE OF DETENTE OR SOVIET VIOLATION OF COMMITMENTS, IT INVOLVES NOT ONLY THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP BUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USSR AND ALL THOSE WESTERN NATIONS WHICH IN RECENT YEARS HAVE PURSUED A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND HAVE SIGNED VARIOUS AGREEMENTS WITH IT. FOR US THE OPERATIONAL ISSUE AT PRESENT IS, HOWEVER, NOT WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE VIOLATED SOME COMMITMENT, BUT HOW ALL THE ALLIES TOGETHER CAN

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HOLD THE SOVIET UNION TO THE KIND OF CONDUCT ALL OF US SEPARATELY AND JOINTLY HAVE ESTABLISHED AS THE STANDARD FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S SECOND STATEMENT

TALKING POINTS

NAC - OCTOBER 16, 1973

1. WE DO NOT TAKE KINDLY TO SUGGESTIONS THAT THE U.S. WAS FOOLISHLY DRAWN INTO DETENTE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE USSR AND MUST NOW USE THOSE SAME RELATIONSHIPS TO DEAL WITH THE USSR OVER THE MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS. WE DO NOT WELCOME PRONOUNCEMENTS FINDING THE SOVIETS IN VIOLATION OF U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENTS WHEN ANY SUCH VIOLATION APPLIES EQUALLY TO UNDERSTANDINGS THAT THE EUROPEANS HAVE WITH THE USSR.
2. THE U.S. HAS NEVER VIEWED DETENTE AS A STATIC POLICY THAT COMES ONE DAY AND DISAPPEARS THE NEXT. THE ONLY SENSIBLE MEANING OF DETENTE IS TO USE IT AS AN INSTRUMENT TO PROTECT OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND AS A MEANS TO RESTRAIN SOVIET EFFORTS TO DAMAGE THEM.
3. IN OUR VIEW, WHAT WE NEED TO CONSIDER NOW AS AN ALLIANCE IS HOW WE CAN COORDINATE OR HARMONIZE A SET OF POLICIES THAT WILL CONFRONT THE SOVIETS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE TO ITS OWN INTERESTS IF THEY CHOOSE TO DAMAGE OURS. THE U.S. CAN, OF COURSE, TAKE ACTIONS ALONE; BUT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE IN THE SPIRIT OF THE ALLIANCE AS JUST SET FORTH ELOQUENTLY IN THE VARIOUS SUBMISSIONS FOR THE YEAR OF EUROPE DECLARATION. THE ALLIANCE CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF HARMONIZING DETENTE POLICIES SHOULD NOW, IF THE ALLIES AGREE, BE TRANSFORMED INTO A CONSENSUS FOR USING THOSE POLICIES IN A CRISIS SITUATION.
4. AMONG THE ACTIONS THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER TOGETHER ARE:✓
 - A SLOWDOWN OR EVEN SUSPENSION OF WESTERN PARTICIPATION IN CSCE AS AN INCONGRUOUS EXERCISE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES;
 - ECONOMIC MEASURES IN SUCH AREAS OF EXPORT CONTROLS, CREDITS, ETC..
 - COMMON PRESSURES ON HUNGARY AND YUGOSLAVIA IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR ACTIVE ROLE IN THE PROLONGATION OF THE MIDDLE-EAST WAR BY DIRECT AND INDIRECT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS FROM THE

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OUTSET OF THE FIGHTING.

-- A REVIEW OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS, SUCH AS THE U.S.-SOVIET PRINCIPLES AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AGREEMENT, FRENCH-SOVIET PRINCIPLES AND CONSULTATION AGREEMENTS, ETC., WITH A VIEW TO UNDERTAKING A COMMON EFFORT TO HOLD THE USSR TO THE TERMS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS.

-- ANY OTHER IDEAS PROPOSED BY SYG LUNS AND BY THE ALLIES WE WISH TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WHILE THE U.S. HAS TAKEN UNILATERAL ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE SUPPLIES FOR ISRAEL, WE CONSIDER THE PRESENT SITUATION A MAJOR TEST FOR THE ALLIANCE. HOW THIS TEST IS MET WILL BE OBSERVED WITH THE GREATEST CARE BY SOVIETS, EAST EUROPEANS, ARABS AND OTHERS.

END TEXT. RUMSFELD

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ACTION NEA-12

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS CAIRO 3136

EO 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR EG US

SUBJECT: OPEN MESSAGE FROM SADAT TO PRESIDENT NIXON

FOLLOWING IS USINT TRANSLATION OF OPEN MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT NIXON WHICH SADAT READ IN SPEECH TODAY,
OCTOBER 16, 1973:

"I THOUGHT OF SENDING A MESSAGE TO NIXON
DEFINING OUR STAND CLEARLY, BUT I HESITATED LEST IT
SHOULD BE MISCONSTRUED. THEREFORE I DECIDED TO SUB-
STITUTE FOR THIS AN OPEN MESSAGE TO HIM FROM HERE.
A MESSAGE WHICH IS DICTATED NOT BY FEAR, BUT BY
CONFIDENCE. A MESSAGE WHICH IS DICTATED NOT BY
WEAKNESS, BUT BY A REAL WILL TO SAFEGUARD PEACE AND
TO PROMOTE THE DETENTE. I WOULD LIKE TO SAY CLEARLY
TO HIM THAT OUR DEMAND IN WAR IS KNOWN, AND THERE IS
NO NEED TO RE-EXPLAIN IT. IF YOU WANT TO KNOW OUR
DEMAND IN PEACE, HERE IS OUR PLAN:

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"1. WE ARE FIGHTING AND WE SHALL FIGHT TO LIBERATE OUR LANDS WHICH WERE OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN 1967, AND TO FIND THE MEANS TO RECOVER AND RESPECT THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IN THIS WE WILL COMMIT OURSELVES TO THE U.N., THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

"2. WE ARE READY TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE ON THE BASIS OF ISRAEL'S IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION, TO THE PRE-JUNE 1967 BORDERS.

"3. ONCE WITHDRAWAL IS COMPLETED FROM ALL THESE TERRITORIES, WE ARE READY TO ATTEND AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE U.N. I SHALL DO MY BEST TO CONVINCE MY COMRADES AMONG THE ARAB LEADERS WHO ARE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CONFLICT WITH THE ENEMY, I SHALL ALSO DO MY BEST TO CONVINCE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE SO THAT WE, TOGETHER WITH THE WORLD COMMUNITY, MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN LAYING DOWN RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR PEACE IN THE REGION BASED ON RESPECT FOR THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA.

"4. WE ARE READY AT THIS HOUR--OR TO BE PRECISE, THIS MOMENT--TO START CLEARING OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND REOPEN IT TO WORLD NAVIGATION, SO THAT IT MIGHT RESUME ITS ROLE IN CONTRIBUTING TO WORLD PROSPERITY. I HAVE ACTUALLY GIVEN THE ORDER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUEZ CANAL AUTHORITY TO START THIS OPERATION ON THE DAY FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE LIBERATION OF THE EASTERN BANK. FIRST PREPARATIONS FOR THIS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

"5. IN ALL THIS, WE ARE NOT READY TO ACCEPT AMBIGUOUS PROMISES OR ELASTIC PHRASES SUBJECT TO ALL (KINDS OF) INTERPRETATIONS, THEREBY WASTING TIME AND RETURNING OUR CASE TO A STALEMATE. WE NO LONGER ACCEPT THIS, WHATEVER THE REASONS OF OTHERS OR THE

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SACRIFICES ON OUR SIDE. WHAT WE WANT NOW IS CLARITY--
CLARITY IN ENDS AND CLARITY IN MEANS."
SMITH

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